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INTRODUCTION

One of the most prominent vestiges of the quest for individual
freedom and self-realization that propelled the cultural revolution in
America in the late 1960s was drugs.1 Since the late 1960s, the use of
drugs in American society has steadily increased. This tcounter-culture
phenomenon has, over the past twenty years, spread to all segments
of American society, including the middle class and working population. 2 Heroin, hallucinogens, prescription drugs for nonmedical purposes, and especially marijuana are among the drugs used and abused
by Americans from all age groups and income levels.3 The use of
cocaine has increased dramatically in recent years, especially by those
over the age of twenty-six 4 who "think they can work harder, faster,

1. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LABOR L.J. 42, 43 (1985).
2. Id. at 42. In 1962, less than 4% of the population had ever used an illegal drug. Id. at
43. Two decades later, The National Institute on Drug Abuse reported that 33% of Americans
over the age of 12 had used illegal drugs. Id.; see U.S. Social Tolerance of Drugs on the Rise,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1983, at A-1, col. 2 [hereinafter U.S. Social Tolerance].
3. Susser, supra note 1, at 43; see U.S. Social Tolerance, supra note 2, at A-1.
4. Between 1979 and 1982, one survey reported that cocaine use by those over 26 had
doubled. U.S. Social Tolerance, supra note 2, at A-1. In 1983, cocaine use among the general
population rose approximately 12%. Susser, supra note 1, at 45 (citing NAT'L NARCOTICS
INTELLIGENCE CONSUIERS CoMm., NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1 (1983)).
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and better" while using the drug.6
Drug abuse in the workplace conceivably impacts a firm's productivity and profits. Drug abuse also endangers the health and safety
of employees, including those who do not use drugs. 6 The increase in
the use of drugs has forced employers in all industries to address the
problems associated with drug abuse. 7 In an effort to curb drug use
by employees, many employers have implemented drug testing programs.8 In fact, massive drug screening is currently being conducted
by approximately twenty-five percent of the Fortune 500 companies. 9
Last year, drug tests were administered to nearly five million Americans.10 Not surprisingly, these tests have raised a difficult combination
of social, medical, and legal issues.
Incidents of drug abuse in the professional sports industry have
been widely publicized.11 Because of America's infatuation with professional sports and sports heroes, individual cases of drug abuse by
professional athletes have received an inordinate amount of media
attention. 12Drug addiction is a powerful illness. Its power has been
particularly apparent in professional sports, where highly-skilled
athletes have destroyed their careers and wasted millions of dollars
because of an inability to control their drug problems.13
Team owners, like employers in other industries, have attempted
to implement drug testing programs as a solution to drug abuse within

.5. Susser, supra note 1 (quoting Business and the Military Face up to Drug Challenge,
Christian Sci. Monitor, May 5, 1982, at 13, col. 1).
6. Id. at 42-43.
7. Id. at 46.
8. Id.
9. Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a DramaticLegal CollisionBetween the Rights
of Employers and Workers, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Reese & Underwood, Special Report.-,I'm Not Worth a Damn, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 14, 1982, at cover, 66-82.

12. See, e.g., Angell, Reflections: The Cheersfor Keith, THE NEW YORKER, May 5, 1986,
at 48-65 (discussion of America's infatuation with the problem of drug abuse in professional
sports).
13.

See, e.g., Reilly, When the Cheers Turned to Tears, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 14,

1986, at 28-34. Several players, including John Drew, John Lucas, and Quinton Dailey, have
been suspended without pay from the National Basketball Association (NBA) because of drug
problems. Michael Ray Richardson, a star guard with the New Jersey Nets, was banned from
the NBA after his third drug infiaction. Angell, supra note 12, at 49. Most tragic, of course,
were the recent cocaine related deaths of Boston Celtic draft choice Len Bias and Cleveland
Browns safety Don Rogers. Reilly, supra, at 29.
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the sports industry. 14 Considerable attention has been focused on vari-

ous issues surrounding the implementation of these programs, including the reliability of the tests administered by individual teams,15 the
efficacy of testing as a means to curb drug abuse, and the privacy
rights of individual players.16 Another issue raised by drug testing
within the context of professional sports, and one that has been less
publicized, is the potential conflict between employer and employee
rights under federal labor laws. 17 Team owners perceive drug testing
14. Prior to the 1986 Major League Baseball (MLB) season, individual teams insisted on
the inclusion of drug testing clauses in individual player contracts. Brief of the Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n (MLBPA), In re Arbitration between: MLBPA and the 26 Major League
Clubs, Grievance No. 86-1 (Jan. 6, 1986). Similarly, at the conclusion of the 1985 NFL season,
eight teams attempted to force players to submit to drug testing as part of their post-season
physical examinations. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
15. Current drug testing procedures are unreliable for a number of reasons. See Morgan,
Problems of Mass Urine Screeningfor Misused Drugs, 16 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305, 306
(1984). The tests are designed to yield a qualitative positive or negative result, and the potential
exists for both false negatives and false positives. A false negative indicates that no evidence
of drugs is present in the urine even though the person tested has recently ingested one of the
drugs sought. The EMIT test, the most commonly used drug test, is extremely sensitive and,
unless the enzyme function is altered because the sample is old or because ionizing salts have
been placed in the urine, failure to detect drugs actually ingested rarely occurs. Id. at 308.
False positives, however, frequently occur. See Angell, supra note 12, at 56 (persistent error
factor of 15-20%). But see Allen & Stiles, Specificity of the EMIT Drug Abuse Urine Assay
Methods, 18 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 1043, 1044, 1062 (1981) (estimating incidence of false

positives at 3-5%). Because the EMIT test is so sensitive, the results can be positive even
though the drug sought is not present. Failure to clean the instruments, as well as human
error, can produce unreliable results. Morgan, supra, at 309. When the number of tests increases,
so does the error rate. Id. at 313-14.
Even absent human error, false positives commonly occur because of cross-reactivity. Allen
& Stiles, supra, at 1062; Morgan, supra, at 309-12. Cross reactivity means that other substances
produce the same reaction in the urine as marijuana. In 1981, researchers from the University
of Oklahoma found 62 substances, including aspirin, that can create false positives. Allen &
Stiles, supra, at 1045-60. Several prescription analgesic drugs may cause false positives. Id. In
addition, the human body produces substances that may create false positives in urine screens.
Id. at 1062.
The tests are not drug specific and, thus, do not indicate whether a person who tests positive
has smoked marijuana or taken aspirin or some other drug. See id. at 1064. Thus, the danger
exists that many athletes who do not smoke marijuana might be disciplined on the basis of
inaccurate results. Because these tests are subject to inaccurate results, they should not be
used to identify illegal or deviant behavior. See Morgan, supra, at 316.
For a discussion of the reliability of current drug testing technology, see Morgan, supra, at
305-17; Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, DRUG L. REP., May-June 1983, at 25-36.
16. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Laws Provide Framework for Procedure, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1986, at S2; Glasser, Right to Privacy is a Basic Principle, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at S2.
MLB and NFL players and union leaders also voiced privacy concerns. See Angell, supra note
12, at 48-65, (reference to privacy concerns on the part of MLB players); Neff & Sullivan, The
NFL and Drugs: Fumbling for a Game Plan, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 10, 1986, at 83
(reference to privacy concerns on the part of NFLPA).
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as a dramatic and, from a public relations standpoint, useful solution
to a complex problem and have, along with league commissioners,
attempted to unilaterally implement team and league-wide compulsory
drug testing programs., s Players' associations have challenged these
"unilateral" efforts, not because the associations have categorically
refused drug testing programs, but because of their obligation as the
players' exclusive bargaining representatives to participate in the formation of such programs.' 9

Despite these concerns, drug testing programs proposed by team owners probably do not
raise constitutional questions. The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect against unreasonable searches or seizures by the state or federal government. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). Blood, urinalysis, and breathalyzer tests all constitute searches within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 771 (blood alcohol test); Shoemaker v. Handel,
609 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C.N.J. 1985) (urinalysis and breathalyzer tests). The Constitution, however,
does not shield a person from conduct, no matter how discriminating or wrongful, by a private
person. State action is necessary to invoke the Constitution. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13, (1948); Johnson v. Educational Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1985).
Conduct by professional sports team owners probably will not constitute state action. However, no precise formula exists to determine when "otherwise private conduct constitutes state
action." See, e.g., Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984). State action has been
extended to persons performing government functions or receiving government assistance. See,
e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946); Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
Admittedly, state governments regulate professional sports franchises, but this involvement
would not constitute state action. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, a court
would be unlikely to find that a professional sports league performed a traditionally exclusive
state prerogative. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1975) (operating utility plants and private schools are not functions
traditionally reserved to the state).
For a discussion of the constitutionality of drug testing in the context of college sports, see
Lock & Jennings, The Constitutionalityof MandatoryStudent-Athlete Drug Testing Programs:
The Bounds of Privacy, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 582 (1986).
17. For an overview of professional sports and the labor laws, see L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW §§ 4.1-.3(c) (1977).
18. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text for discussion of attempts by NFL management to unilaterally implement drug testing. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text
for a discussion of NFL Commissioner Rozelle's attempt to unilaterally implement drug testing.
MLB owners and MLB Commissioner Ueberroth made similar efforts. See supra note 14; see
also N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, at I5, col. 2 (commissioner soliciting player participation in
testing programs and major league clubs inserting mandatory drug testing clauses in contracts).
19. In a 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NFLPA agreed to urinalysis testing
during pre-season physical examinations and for probable cause. 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN NFLPA AND NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, art. XXXI [hereinafter
1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT]. The NFLPA argued that the union and management had appropriately bargained for a drug program in 1982 and that the bargaining table
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This article will discuss the legal issues raised by the efforts of
professional sports leagues and individual team owners to implement
drug testing programs. The relevant legal principles have broad application and are clearly useful in analyzing drug testing programs by
employers in other unionized industries. Section II will summarize the
factual context in which drug testing has been proposed or implemented within the National Football League (NFL). Section II also
includes a summary of the recent disputes between the NFL and the
NFL Players' Association (NFLPA) regarding the issue of drug testing
and the two arbitration decisions resolving these disputes.
Section III focuses on the general question of whether management
has the right under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 to
unilaterally implement, without first bargaining with the union, the
type of drug testing programs proposed in professional sports. The
answer depends upon the classification of these drug testing programs
as mandatory or non-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.21
Although the classification of these programs as either mandatory or
non-mandatory has a significant impact on the bargaining relationship
between the parties, neither the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) nor the arbitrators has considered this issue.
The NFLPA filed an unfair labor practice charge in one of the two
disputes ultimately resolved at arbitration.2 The NLRB, in accordance
with its broad deferral policies,2 deferred the dispute to arbitration.
The arbitrators, in each of the two disputes, appropriately based their
decisions on contractual grounds and concluded that management's
unilateral action violated the League's 1982 collective bargaining agreement. 24 Neither arbitrator addressed the question of whether a drug

was the proper place to discuss future agreements on that topic. See infra notes 47-71, 75-91
and accompanying text.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. Employers and representatives of employees must "meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ......
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). These subjects are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining and
it is an unfair labor practice for management to refuse to bargain over any topic that falls within
this category. Id. § 158(a)(5). For a discussion of the distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory subjects, see infra notes 108-60 and accompanying text.
22. See Charge Against NFLMC, NLRB Case No. 2-CA-21403 (Dec. 18, 1985) (filed by
NFLPA).
23. See Levy, The UnidimensionalPerspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 RUTGERS
L.J. 269-890 (1985); see also infra notes 298-310 and accompanying text (discussion of NLRB's
deferral policies).
24. See Opinion and Decision, In re Arbitration between NFLMC and NFLPA, Re: Post-
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testing program constitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.as As a result, questions concerning the bargaining rights and

obligations of the parties with respect to drug programs still exist as
the parties approach the upcoming negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement. Section IV contains a brief discussion of the
NLRB's deferral policies.
Random drug testing is the most controversial element of the drug
programs proposed in professional sports. Management has taken the
position that random testing is justified because it is "good for the

industry.

' 26

Management's right to implement random drug testing,

however, depends not on the merits of random testing but on the
classification of this topic as either a mandatory or non-mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. This article analyzes the issue of drug
testing programs under the NLRA and concludes that this issue con-

stitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
II.
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

History of Drug Problems in the National Football League

Although the problem of drug abuse among athletes has only recently dominated the sports pages, the presence of drugs in the NFL
is not a new phenomenon. During the 1970s, isolated instances of drug
abuse appeared periodically in the press.Y By 1982, evidence of widespread drug abuse in the NFL became public.28

Season Physical Examinations (Oct. 20, 1986) (Kagel, Arb.); Opinion and Decision, In re Arbitration Among the NFLPA and the NFLMC and the NFL (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.).
25. In the Arbitration Pursuant to Article VII, the arbitrator held that the Commissioner
could unilaterally implement a drug policy to augment the League's existing policy if the augmented policy did not contradict the collective bargaining agreement. Opinion and Award,
Expedited Arbitration Pursuant to Article VII, In re Arbitration Among the NFLPA and the
NFLMC and the NFL (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.). See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
text.
26. Rozelle publicly stated that the drug problem was an economic problem that could affect
league income and ultimately cripple the NFL finanrcially. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1986, at
B8, col. 4. At the same time, the NFL insisted that more extensive testing was an essential
deterrent to drug use. Neff & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 83. The MLBPA noted that major
league clubs also argued that testing is "good" for the industry. See Brief of the Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n (MLBPA) at 27, In re Arbitration between: MLBPA and the 26 Major
League Clubs, Grievance No. 86-1 (Jan. 6, 1986) (arbitration involving attempts by MLB clubs
to insert drug testing clauses in individual player contracts).
27. For examples of NFL drug-related problems in the 1970s, see Drugs in the NFL, USA
Today, Jan. 29, 1986 at C3; Mandell, Pro Football Fumbles the Drug Scandal, PSYCH. TODAY,
June 1975, at 39-47; Underwood, Speed is all the Rage, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1978,
at 30-41.
28. See, e.g., Reese & Underwood, supra note 11.
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In July, 1982, former Miami Dolphin and New Orleans Saint Don
Reese stated in an article published in Sports Illustrated that "a
cocaine cloud covers the entire league." Reese suggested a large
number of players in the NFL had a drug problem. Reese identified
teammates and other players who used and purchased cocaine in his
presence. 30 Perhaps as a result of that article, several players were

placed in drug dependency programs.3 1 Miami owner Joe Robbie admitted in 1982 that several suspected drug users were cut or traded from
the Dolphins following the 1976 season. Robbie's admission suggests
that management had been aware of the problem before it became

public. 32
Not surprisingly, the drug problem surfaced in 1982 as an issue
during the negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. In
June, 1982, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle instructed individual
teams to implement drug programs.33 On July 19, 1982, the NFLPA
filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the NFL Management Council (NFLMC) had unilaterally implemented drug programs
and urinalysis testing without first bargaining with the union. While
that charge was pending, the NFLPA continued to demand collective
negotiations on the drug issue.s Nonetheless, individual teams con-

tinued to cooperate with league-sponsored lectures on drug abuse and
drug counseling programs.6

29. Id. at 69.
30. Id.
31. Cleveland running back Charles White, San Diego running back Chuck Muncie, Minnesota defensive end Randy Holloway and Denver wide receiver Rick Upchurch were among
those placed in drug dependency programs in 1982. Drugs in the NFL, USA Today, Jan. 29,
1986, at C3.
32. Id.
33. Telephone interview with Timothy J. English, Staff Counsel, NFLPA (Sept. 10, 1983).
34. Charge Against Constituent Member Clubs of the NFL, NLRB Case No. 2-CA-18995
(July 19, 1982) (filed by NFLPA).
35. Supplemental Affidavit of Richard A. Berthelsen, NFLPA attorney, submitted to NLRB
to supplement previous affidavits filed on July 19, 1982 and Aug. 11, 1982, at 5-6 (Sept. 22, 1982).
36. Id. The cooperation by individual teams led to another unfair labor practice charge. In
August 1982, representatives from the League office visited individual teams to conduct lectures
on drugs. Id. Prior to a meeting with the Buffalo Bills, Bills' player-representative Mike Kadish
confronted the League representatives with questions concerning confidentiality, penalties, and
testing procedures under the proposed program. As a result of this confrontation, the meeting
was cancelled and, on September 8, the Bills released Kadish. Telephone interview with Timothy
J. English, Staff Counsel, NFLPA (Sept. 10, 1983). Almost immediately thereafter, the NFLPA
filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Kadish had been discharged because of his
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The unfair labor practice charge was withdrawn as part of a settlement agreement between the NFLPA and NFLMC executed on December 11, 1982, the same day the new collective bargaining agreement was signed.37 Article XXXI of the new agreement addressed the
problem of drug abuse in the League 8 Under section 5 of that article,
each player is obligated to undergo a standardized minimum pre-season
physical examination conducted by the team physician. The standardized minimum examination is outlined in appendix D of the agreement
and includes urinalysis and blood testing. Section 5 also provides for
a post-season physical examination. Section 7 states that the team
physician, upon reasonable cause, can direct a player to the Hazelden
Foundation in Center City, Minnesota. The Hazelden Foundation administers the league-wide drug program, testing for chemical abuse
or dependency problems. Perhaps most significantly, section 7 clearly
precludes spot checking for chemical abuse or dependency by either
the club or club physician. Section 8 requires that details concerning
the identity or treatment of any player remain confidential and are
not to be the basis for any disciplinary action.
Sections 5 through 8 of article XXXI essentially define the rights
of individual teams to test, treat, or impose disciplinary sanctions upon
players for drug abuse. One other provision in the 1982 collective
bargaining agreement is potentially relevant to the problem of drug
abuse. Article VIII, entitled Commissioner Discipline, gives the
League Commissioner the authority to fine, suspend, or otherwise
discipline individual players for conduct detrimental to the integrity
of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football2 9
Articles VIII and XXXI of the 1982 agreement did little to solve
the NFL's drug problem. In fact, the number of reported incidents
of drug abuse continued to increase. In 1983, Cleveland Browns Head
Coach Sam Rutigliano publicly stated that eight Browns were taking
part in a drug rehabilitation program offered by the team. Also in
1983, other players around the NFL admitted cocaine dependency and
entered rehabilitation centers. 40 Meanwhile, Commissioner Rozelle invoked his power under article VIII and suspended four players, without pay, for four games during the 1983 season because of their involve-

union activities. Charge Against Baltimore Colts and Buffalo Bills and Member Clubs of NFL,
NLRB Case No. 2-CA-19103 (Sept. 9, 1982) (fMled by NFLPA).
37. Settlement agreement between NFLPA and NFLMC 1-4 (Dec. 11, 1982).
38. 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 19, art. XXXI.
39. Id. art. VIII.
40. Drugs in the NFL, USA Today, Jan. 29, 1986, at C3.
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ment with cocaine. 41 Isolated incidences of drug involvement continued
to surface during 1984 and 1985.42 Clearly, the relevant provisions of
the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement failed to discourage the use
of drugs in the NFL.
B.

Recent Disputes Between the National Football League and the
National Football League Players' Association Regarding
Drug Programs

As the number of reported cases of drug abuse in the NFL increased, so did reports of drug abuse in Major League Baseball (MLB)
and the National Basketball Association (NBA). 43 By the fall of 1985,

the use of drugs became one of the most widely reported issues in
the sports industry. In a November 18 interview with Bob Costas on
NBC's "NFL '85," Commissioner Rozelle stated that "the drug issue
is the biggest concern of fans." 4
As the 1985 season progressed, Commissioner Rozelle publicly
suggested that the NFL would push for mandatory drug testing in
the next collective bargaining agreement. 45 The NFLPA polled its
members and reported that 72.5 percent of NFL players opposed spot
checking through urinalysiS.46 In the meantime, several individual owners decided to take immediate action. At the close of the 1985 season,
eight NFL teams attempted to force their players to submit to drug
tests as part of their post-season physical examination. 47 Many players
4s
refused and were fined $1,000 each for their failure to comply.

41. Id. The four players suspended were Pete Johnson and Ross Browner of the Cincinnati
Bengals, E.J. Junior of the St. Louis Cardinals, and Greg Stemrick of the Houston Oilers. Id.
42. Id.
43. For examples of drug use in the NBA, see, e.g., Jasner, NBA Brass, Players Ponder
Spot-Testing, Phila. Daily News, Feb. 17, 1986, at 77 (reference to drug problems of players
John Drew, Quintin Dailey, John Lucas, Michael Ray Richardson and Walter Davis). For examples of drug use in major league baseball see, e.g., Drug Poll Indicates Pros' Use, USA Today,
Sept. 6, 1985, at C5 and Magnuson, Baseball'sDrug Scandal, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 26-28.
44. Rozelle Speaks, USA Today, Nov. 18, 1985, at C1.
45. Forbes, Rozelle: NFL May Push Drug Testing in Contract,USA Today, Oct. 16, 1985,
at C7.
46. Borges, NFLPA Opposes Spot-Testingfor Drug Use, The Boston Globe, Jan. 24, 1986,
at 55.
47. Id. The eight teams that tried to force their players to be tested for drug use were
the Seattle Seahawks, St. Louis Cardinals, Buffalo Bills, New Orleans Saints, New York Jets,
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Detroit Lions, and Indianapolis Colts.
48. Id. The arbitrator's decision in this dispute listed five teams, the Cardinals, Jets, Colts,
Buccaneers, and Saints, that attempted to test players. The decision also indicated that all of
the players on the Colts, Saints, Cardinals, and Jets refused to take the urinalysis test, while
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The NFLPA took the position that urinalysis and blood testing
during the post-season physical examination violated the existing collective bargaining agreement. 49 Therefore, the players' refusal to submit to the tests was justified. The players' association filed an unfair
labor practice charge on December 18, 1985, alleging that implementation of post-season drug tests also constituted a unilateral change
in working conditions in violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
NLRA. In addition, fining employees for asserting their rights
amounted to a violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA °
Eight days later, on December 26, 1985, the NFLMC filed a non-injury grievance against the NFLPA for advising players not to submit
to post-season testing.51 The NFLMC contended that article XXXI,
section 5 of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement permitted clubs
to request post-season physical examinations62 According to management, the NFLPA violated article I, section 3, of the 1982 agreement
by allegedly advising players not to cooperate with the complete postseason physical examinations authorized under article XXXI, section
5. r Article I, section 3 imposes on the union and the management
council the obligation to exercise good faith efforts to ensure that both
players and clubs comply with the terms of the agreement.
While these charges were pending, reports that the New England
Patriots had a team-wide drug problem surfaced in Boston. Super
Bowl XX was quickly overshadowed by a story in the Boston Globe
on January 28, 1986, which estimated that twelve Patriots used drugs
during the 1986 season.-, At the insistence of Head Coach Raymond
Berry, the players agreed to accept a team-wide voluntary drug testing
program.55 The program provided among other things that any recur-

some Buccaneers took the test. Opinion and Decision, In re Arbitration between NFLMC and
NFLPA, Re: Post-Season Physical Examinations 4 (Oct. 20, 1986) (Kagel, Arb.).
49. Id. at 3.
50. Charge Against NFLMC, NLRB Case No. 2-CA-21403 (Dec. 18, 1985) (filed by
NFLPA).
51. NFLMC v. NFLPA, Non-Injury Grievance Concerning Post-Season Physical Examinations, Dec. 26, 1985.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 19, art. I).
54. Super Bowl XX was played on January 26, 1986. The Chicago Bears defeated the New
England Patriots 46-10. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at Al, col. 1. Two days later an article
exposing an alleged drug problem on the New England Patriots appeared on the front page of
the Boston Globe. Borges, Drug Problem is Disclosed by Patriots; Dozen Involved, Boston
Globe, Jan. 28, 1986, at 1, 67.
55. Id. On January 27, 1986, the New England Patriots agreed to participate in a voluntary
drug testing program.
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rence by a rehabilitated player would result in an immediate one-year
suspension without pay. 5
The NFLPA's response to the Patriots' plan was predictable. The
NFLPA publicly accused the Patriots of repudiating the drug testing
provisions of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement 57 and, on January 29, filed an unfair labor practice charge.s The charge alleged
that the Patriots violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by
attempting to implement more rigorous drug testing procedures than
those contained in the 1982 agreement and by bypassing the union to
deal directly with employees concerning important terms and conditions of employment. 59
Meanwhile, Commissioner Rozelle continued to campaign for mandatory testing. At NFL meetings in March, 1986, Rozelle stressed
the need for random drug testing to combat the drug problem. He
felt the drug problem could affect the NFL's television revenues and
gate receipts, and ultimately cripple the NFL financially.6 He warned
that if the union failed to agree to a tougher drug plan, he was prepared
to bypass the NFLPA and implement his own plan including random
testing. 61 Presumably, Commissioner Rozelle believed that his power
as Commissioner to deal with problems affecting the integrity of the
game authorized him to impose league-wide mandatory testing.62
The NFLPA publicly indicated that it would oppose any unilateral
action by Commissioner Rozelle to institute random testing,6 partly
because random testing constituted an invasion of privacy.6 More
significantly, the union believed Commissioner Rozelle lacked author-

56. Under the plan, the team would recommend a course of action for players with drug
problems. The identity of those players would remain confidential. Id. Despite the team's promise
of confidentiality, six Patriot players were identified in the Boston Globe as having drug problems
and, as a result, the players' agreement to accept the plan collapsed on January 29. The six
Patriot players were Irving Fryar, Stephen Starring, Tony Collins, Roland James, Raymond
Clayborn, and Kenneth Sims. Neff & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 84.
57. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at B5, cel. 1.
58. Charge Against the NFL Management Council and the New England Patriots, NLRB
Case No. 2-CA-21476 (Jan. 29, 1986) (filed by NFLPA).
59. Id.
60. Forbes, Rozelle Ready to Fight Drug Problem on His Own Terms, USA Today, Mar.
11, 1986, at C5.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Wojciechowski, Rozelle Says He's Ready to Impose Drug-Testing Plan on NFL Players,
L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 1986, at III-1, col. 1.
64. Forbes, supra note 60, at C5.
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ity under the 1982 agreement to impose a league-wide program and
that such an action would constitute a breach of the current drug
policy contained in article XXXI.6 Despite the union's position, Commissioner Rozelle, at a meeting with NFLPA representatives on July
1, 1986, indicated he felt compelled to exercise his authority under
article VIII in order to improve the current NFL drug program.6
On July 7, Commissioner Rozelle publicly announced a new drug
program for the NFL. The new program required every player to
submit to two unscheduled urine tests during the regular season. 67
Commissioner Rozelle also announced his intention to establish a set
of procedures under which players who tested positive could be immediately removed from the active roster. In extreme cases, players
could be permanently banned from the NFL.r The NFLPA immediately filed injunctive motions in the District Court for the District
of Columbia 9 under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 70 challenging Commissioner Rozelle's authority to implement the
new program.7 1 The dispute was submitted to arbitration.
C.

Recent ArbitrationDecisions Regarding Drug Programs

The NLRB did not hear these disputes. The NFLPA withdrew
its unfair labor practice charge against the Patriots in June, 1986,
after the Patriots publicly announced their decision not to implement
the team-wide drug testing plan.72 The NLRB deferred the post-season
testing charge to arbitration." Perhaps because the NFLPA knew the

65. Wojciechowski, supra note 63, at III-1. Despite its rejection of management's proposal
for random testing, and in response to a desire by the players themselves to implement a
stricter policy on drugs, the NFLPA proposed a new plan on March 19, 1986 to deal with drug
abuse. Under the plan, players who tested positive during their pre-season urinalysis would be
subject to treatment and random testing. Second offenders would be subject to treatment and
random testing and would also be fined one game's pay. A third offense would result in permanent
suspension from the League, subject to review after one year. Both Rozelle and the NFLMC,

reiterating their desire for random testing, publicly rejected the union's proposal. Weisman,
Drug Proposal Garners Support, USA Today, Mar. 20, 1986, at C3.
66. Opinion and Award, Expedited Arbitration Pursuant to Article VII, In re Arbitration
Among the NFLPA and the NFLMC and the NFL 18 (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.).
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. NFLPA v. NFLMC & NFL, C.A. No. 86-1918, July 11, 1986.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
71. Opinion and Award, Expedited Arbitration Pursuant to Article VII, In re Arbitration
Among the NFLPA and the NFLMC and the NFL 2 (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.).
72. Telephone interview with Timothy J. English, Staff Counsel, NFLPA (Apr. 1987).
73. Id. The Regional Director notified the NFLPA in a letter dated April 30, 1986 that it
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NLRB would also defer to arbitration the dispute over Commissioner
Rozelle's league-wide program, the NFLPA declined to file an unfair
labor practice charge in that case. Arbitration decisions in the post-season testing and Rozelle cases were resolved in favor of the NFLPA
in late October, 1986. 4
Arbitration hearings were held on June 17, 1986, to determine
management's right under the 1982 collective bargaining agreement
to administer drug tests as part of the post-season physical examination. The NFLPA contended that the 1982 agreement authorized only
two forms of drug tests: a mandatory drug test for all players during
the pre-season physical, and testing upon reasonable cause. 7 In the
union's opinion, the language and bargaining history of article XXXI
as well as the "zipper clause" contained in article II, section 1 of the
agreement precluded management from testing for drugs during the
post-season examination.76 The NFLMC argued that the language of
article XXXI, section 5 did not exclude drug testing from the post-season physical examination. 77 In addition, management reserved, under
the management rights provision in article I, section 4, all management
rights except as specifically limited by the provisions of the 1982
agreement.78
The arbitrator issued an-opinion on October 20, 1986. After reviewing the bargaining history between the parties, the arbitrator concluded that management could not implement post-season drug testing
without violating the 1982 agreement. 79 The subject of drug testing

was submitted to collective bargaining and the parties specifically
agreed to pre-season and reasonable cause testing. ° The arbitrator
noted that at no time during the negotiations did the NFLMC seek
to extend its right to test for drugs to post-season examinations.81

was deferring the post-season urinalysis charge (NLRB Case No. 2-CA-21403) to arbitration. Id.
74. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
75. Opinion and Decision, In re Arbitration between NFLMC and NFLPA Re: Post-Season
Physical Examinations 11 (Oct. 20, 1985) (Kagel, Arb.).
76. Id. at 11-13; 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 19, art. II, § 1.
77. Opinion and Decision, In re Arbitration between NFMLC and NFLPA Re: Post-Season
Physical Examinations 13 (Oct. 20, 1985) (Kagel, Arb.).
78. Id. at 10-11 & 13; see also 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note
19, art. I, § 4 (clubs have right to manage unless specifically limited by collective bargaining
agreement).
79. Opinion and Decision, In re Arbitration between NFLMC and NFLPA Re: Post-Season
Physical Examinations 33 (Oct. 20, 1985) (Kagel, Arb.).
80. Id. at 32.
81. Id.
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The arbitrator also rejected the management council's argument
that post-season testing was permissible under article I, section 4 of
the 1982 agreement. Since the agreement specifically limited management's right to test, no residual rights remained with respect to drug
testing. Therefore, the "management rights" provision did not apply.8
The arbitrator did not address the underlying unfair labor practice
charge.
Five days later, on October 25, 1986, the arbitrator reached a
decision regarding Commissioner Rozelle's league-wide drug program.
As with post-season testing, the arbitrator concluded that Commissioner Rozelle's provision for unscheduled testing could not be implemented without violating the 1982 agreement. In 1982, the
NFLPA had initially resisted language permitting testing of any kind. 4
Although the union ultimately conceded the pre-season and reasonable
cause testing in article XXXI, that provision specifically precluded
spot checking.
The NFLMC argued that Commissioner Rozelle's proposal for two
unscheduled tests did not conflict with this prohibition on spot checking
since all players, as opposed to randomly selected players, would be
subject to the unscheduled tests . 6 Relying on the bargaining history
of the 1982 agreement and the language of article XXXI, the arbitrator
rejected this argument.87 The 1982 negotiations neither addressed nor
contemplated unscheduled drug testing. Furthermore, the language
of article XXXI was not broad enough to permit additional testing.As
Thus, the arbitrator found that unscheduled testing conflicted with
and was therefore superseded by the language of article XXXI. 9
The arbitrator concluded, however, that Commissioner Rozelle had
the power under article VIII to augment a pre-existing drug program
if the augmented program did not contradict any provisions in the
1982 agreement.9 Thus, several aspects of Commissioner Rozelle's
program were enforceable because they did not contradict article
XXXI. For example, the arbitrator indicated that Commissioner

82. Id. at 33.
83. Opinion and Award, Expedited Arbitration Pursuant to Article VII, In re Arbitration
Among the NFLPA and the NFLMC and the NFL 72 (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.).

84.
85.

Id. at 70.
Id. at 70-71.

86.
87.
88.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 71-72.
Id.

89.

Id. at 72.

90.

Id. at 72-76.
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Rozelle had authority to address the specifics of aftercare for players

who tested positive, the status of players hospitalized for drug treatment and their right to pay, and the extent to which players would
be disciplined for improper drug involvement.91

To support this position, the arbitrator rejected the NFLPA's argument that the NFL could not unilaterally implement an augmented
drug program without violating the NLRA.9 2 In the arbitrator's opinion, the Commissioner historically retained certain "integrity of the
game" authority. 93 Thus, the arbitrator felt that the NFLPA could

not complain that the continued exercise of that authority violated the
duty to bargain under the NLRA.Y
Two aspects of these arbitration decisions are unsettling. First,
the arbitrator's remarks concerning both the scope of Rozelle's "integrity of the game" authority and the merits of the NFLPA's unfair
labor practice charge are unsubstantiated. The arbitrator cited absolutely no authority to support his position. In fact, the one dispute
between the NFLPA and the NFL, questioning the scope of Commissioner power, suggests that the Commissioner's right under the collective bargaining agreement to discipline a player for conduct detrimental to the game does not empower him to unilaterally implement
league-wide rules that affect the employment condition of players. 5

91. Id. at 67-68.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 67.
94. Id. at 68.
95. In 1972, the NFLPA filed an unfair labor practice charge challenging both the League's
right and the Commissioner's power to unilaterally implement a rule providing for an automatic
fine to be levied against any player leaving the bench area while a fight was in progress on the
field. NFLMC & NFL, 203 N.L.R.B. 958 (1973). The Board dismissed the complaint, finding
that the fine was implemented not by the owners but by the Commissioner and was as such a
valid exercise of his "integrity of the game" power. Id. at 959.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed and remanded the case to the Board with instructions to adopt
a remedy consistent with its opinion. NFLPA v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974). The
court found that the bench fine rule was adopted by the owners and, as a result, amounted to
a unilateral change in conditions of employment. Id. at 16-17. Because the court based its
decision on this finding that the owners implemented the rule, the court was not forced to
determine the scope of the Commissioner's power. Yet, the court suggested that the Commissioner lacked the power to implement the bench fine rule. Id. at 17. The union had argued that
the Commissioner's right under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to fine a player
for conduct detrimental to the game did not empower him to adopt and promulgate the leaguewide bench fine rule. Id. at 14. Citing applicable provisions from the Bylaws and CBA, the
court acknowledged that the union's position with respect to the scope of the Commissioner's
power had merit. Id. at 16 n.3. The Commissioner had no authority to make changes in practices
that affected the employment conditions of players. Id.
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More important, the resolution of each of these disputes on contractual grounds left unanswered various questions concerning the
scope of the parties' bargaining obligations under the NLRA with
respect to drug testing programs. Thus, these decisions failed to eliminate uncertainty over management's right to refuse to discuss the
topic of drug programs during collective bargaining, management's
right to unilaterally implement its own program after an agreement
has been reached, and the right of either party to use economic
weapons or bargain to impasse in an effort to realize its position on
the subject of drug testing. The answers to these questions depend
upon whether the issue of drug programs constitutes a mandatory or
non-mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the NLRA. This
issue was ignored in each arbitration decision.9
III.

TESTING AS MANDATORY VERSUS NON-MANDATORY
SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A.

Introduction

One of the most controversial aspects of the drug testing programs
proposed in professional sports involves management's right under the
NLRA to unilaterally implement these programs. League commissioners and individual franchise owners have publicly argued that random
drug testing is good for the industry.97 This argument has in turn
generated reactions from both unions and players concerning privacy
rights93 the accuracy of the tests, 99 whether testing will deter drug
use, and whether test results can be kept confidential.100

96. Subsections 8(a)(5) and (b)(3) impose a duty on both employers and unions to "bargain
. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982). Section 8 defines the duty to "bargain
collectively" as the natural obligation to meet and confer "with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." Id. § 158(d). These subjects are mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining. Both employers and unions must bargain in good faith over these
subjects. In addition, either party may bargain to impasse or resort to the use of economic
weapons over a mandatory subject. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text; see generally,
collectively .

R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, 496-98 (1976). In the arbitration proceedings involv-

ing Rozelle's league-wide plan, the arbitrator concluded that the commissioner could unilaterally
augment an existing program without violating the NLRA if the augmented program did not
contradict the existing program. That decision, however, simply held that the commissioner
historically had the power to make such unilateral changes. The arbitrator held neither that
the owners had this same power nor that drug testing was a non-mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. See supra notes 83-94, and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 26.
98. See supra note 16.
99. See supra note 15.
100. The MLBPA questioned whether drug testing would deter drug use and whether the
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Drug testing may, as the owners contend, be good for the industry.

Yet, neither the merits of drug testing nor the validity of any of the
players' concerns is relevant to the legality of management-established

programs. 10 1 Management's right to implement random drug testing
without first bargaining with the union depends on the classification
of drug programs as either a mandatory or a permissive subject of
collective bargaining.
If drug programs fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining,102
management will violate the NLRA if it unilaterally adopts a drug

program without first bargaining with the union.oa Both parties have
an obligation to bargain over mandatory subjects, and a failure to do
so constitutes a refusal to bargain under either subsection 8(a)(5) or

8(b)(3).1" Either party also has the right, with respect to mandatory
subjects, to insist on its position to impasse and even back its position
with a strike or lockout.105 Thus, both management and the union
could, at the bargaining table, refuse a drug program proposed by its
opponent and, at the same time, use economic weapons to pressure
the other party to accept its own proposal.

results of testing could be kept confidential. Brief of the Major League Baseball Players Ass'n
(MLBPA) at 27-28, In re Arbitration between: MLBPA and the 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance No. 86-1 (Jan. 6, 1986). Confidentiality was an issue in the New England Patriots attempt
to implement a team wide plan. See supra note 56.
101. The MLBPA noted the lack of legal significance of the merits of drug testing. Brief
of the Major League Baseball Players Ass'n (MLBPA) at 27-28, In re Arbitration between:
MLBPA and the 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance No. 86-1 (Jan. 6, 1986).
102. For a discussion of what subjects fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining, see
Harper, Leveling the Road From Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of
MandatoryBargaining,68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982); infranotes 108-60 and accompanying text.
103. An employer who unilaterally changes an item subject to mandatory bargaining violates
its duty to bargain under § 8(a)(5). See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
104. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA states that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of Section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). Section 8(b)(3) states: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of Section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982). Section 9(a) states:
[R]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
105.

See R. GORMAN, supra note 96, at 496.
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Non-mandatory or permissive subjects may be proposed by either
party. Yet, neither party is obligated to bargain over or discuss such
subjects. The proponent of a non-mandatory subject can neither bargain to impasse nor resort to the use of economic weapons to obtain
its demands. 0 6 In effect, management can unilaterally implement decisions falling outside the scope of mandatory bargaining and the union
is precluded from either demanding bargaining over the matter or
striking to compel management to modify its decision.
An employer's willingness to discuss non-mandatory terms during
collective bargaining does not change its statutory obligations. Thus,
even if an employer bargains over and agrees to a permissive term,
that term is unenforceable under the NLRA. In other words, the
07
employer can breach the contract without violating the NLRA.
Clearly, a determination that a subject is mandatory significantly impacts the bargaining relationship between the parties with respect to
that particular subject.
B.

Scope of Mandatory Bargaining
1.

Statutory Language

The NLRA was designed to eliminate "obstructions to the free
flow of commerce .. . by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining.' '0 8 This policy is theoretically enforced by the
unfair labor practice provisions of the Act.' 0 9 Thus, an employer commits an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain collectively, while a union's refusal to bargain violates section
8(b)(3). 110

106. Id.; see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958)
(party not obligated to bargain over nonmandatory subject).
107. An employer does not violate § 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing, during the term of
the contract, a provision agreed upon in the contract regarding non-mandatory subjects. Allied
Chem. Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
109. The sanctions under the Act are weak and the processing of unfair labor practices
takes a long time; therefore, employers actually have an incentive to refuse to bargain in good
faith in some situations. See Lock, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act and the
1982 National FootballLeague PlayersStrike: Wave that Flag, 1985 ARIz. ST. L.J. 113, 114-15;
see also Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices During the 1982 National Football League
Strike: Help on the Way, 6 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 189, 190-93 (1985) (slow process of
resolving unfair labor practice charges and short careers of professional athletes provide opportunity for management misconduct).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982).
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The duty to bargain collectively is defined in section 8(d). 111 Under
this provision, both employers and unions are obligated to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. Parties are free to
bargain over any legal subject. Yet, Congress specifically limited the
duty to bargain to those matters involving "wages, hours, and other
2
terms and conditions of employment.11

The term "wages" has been construed broadly. It includes hourly
pay rates, overtime pay, merit pay and incentive plans, and fringe
benefits in the form of cash or cash equivalents, such as pensions,
paid holidays and vacations, group health insurance, profit-sharing
plans, and stock-purchase plans.113 The statutory term '"ours"includes
the period of time during which employees work. Thus, employers
must bargain over the particular hours of the day and days of the
week that employees will be required to work.114
The scope of "other terms and conditions of employment" is not
as clearly defined as "wages" and "hours." The original House bill for
section 8(d) contained a specific listing of mandatory bargaining subjects.11 5 Congress rejected that bill because it artificially limited the
appropriate subjects of collective bargaining. As an alternative, Congress deliberately adopted the general language "other terms and
''
conditions of employment. 116
The Supreme Court interpreted this legislative history as evidence
of a conscious congressional decision to give the NLRB broad latitude
to define the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in light of
specific industrial practices. 117 Unfortunately, the NLRB has been un-

111. Id. § 158(d) (1982).
112. Id.
113. See NLRB v. Compton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1948); NLRB v. Everbrite
Elec. Signs, 562 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F.2d 964 (8th
Cir. 1967) (hourly pay rates); Tom Johnson, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1965), enforced, 378 F.2d
342 (9th Cir. 1967) (overtime pay); Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(stock-purchase plans); NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953) (merit
pay and incentive plans); NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954) (profit
sharing plans); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) (group health
insurance); Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1942)
(paid holidays and vacation). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 96, at 498-502.
114. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 726-29 (1965); Gallen
Kamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968) (hours of day and days of week during
which employees work is mandatory subject).
115. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11)(B), 93 CONG. REC. 3548 (1947), reprinted in
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA OF 1947, at 66-67 (1948).
116. H.R. CONF. REP. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1947).
117. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981).
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able to articulate any general principle clearly defining the scope of
mandatory bargaining. 11s As a result, both the NLRB and lower courts
frequently decide scope of bargaining cases through ad hoc balancing
of employer and employee interests.119 Not surprisingly, the lack of
clear principles has resulted in inconsistent decisions and confusion
between employees and employers over bargaining rights and obligations. 120
2.

Supreme Court Precedents

The Supreme Court has considered the scope of mandatory bargaining on three occasions. 1 On two of those occasions, the Court was
forced to determine whether specific employer decisions having a direct
impact on the continued employment of a group of employees fell
within the scope of "other terms and conditions of employment. ' ' 12
The Court, like the NLRB, failed to articulate a clear, workable principle applicable to all scope of bargaining cases. Nonetheless, the
Court's language in these two decisions provides some guidance for
the NLRB and lower courts.
In FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 12 the employer
unilaterally decided to subcontract maintenance work performed by
unit employees. At the expiration of the labor contract, the employer
terminated the maintenance employees. The NLRB held that the employer was obligated to bargain over both the decision to subcontract
and the effects of that decision.m The Supreme Court, affirming the

118. See Harper, supra note 102, at 1449.
119. Id. at 1449, 1451-56.
120. Id. at 1456.
121. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342 (1958).
122. First National Aaintenance involved a decision by the employer to shut down part
of his business, thereby eliminating jobs. 452 U.S. at 669-70; see infra text accompanying notes
129-44. Fibreboardinvolved a decision by the employer to subcontract work previously performed
by unit employees. 379 U.S. at 204-97; see infra text accompanying notes 123-28. Borg-Warner,
however, involved the question of whether an employer could condition an agreement upon the
union's acceptance of two clauses: a "ballot clause" requiring an employee vote on the employer's
last bargaining offer as a prerequisite to a strike; and a clause recognizing as bargaining agent
a local unit of the United Automobile Workers rather than the international unit certified by
the NLRB. 356 U.S. at 343-44. The Court held that the employer's insistence on these two
clauses as a condition to an agreement was unlawful since these clauses were non-mandatory

subjects of collective bargaining. Id. at 349-50.
123.

Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 204-07.

124. Id. at 208.
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NLRB's decision, relied on several factors to find that the employer's
decision to subcontract was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Court noted that employer decisions resulting in terminations
fell within the broad meaning of "terms and conditions of employment."
The Court stressed that the purposes of the NLRA were furthered
by bringing matters "of vital concern to labor and management" within
the bargaining framework established by Congress. Industrial practice
indicated that subcontracting was a topic commonly contained in collective bargaining agreements, thus providing additional support for
the decision.m Significantly, the Court noted that the employer's decision to subcontract neither altered the company's basic operation
nor required any capital investment. Thus, requiring an employer to
bargain over this matter "would not significantly abridge his freedom
to manage the business."'2
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, interpreted conditions
of employment less expansively than the majority. He argued that
employers should have the right to unilaterally implement decisions
that "are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise
or... impinge only indirectly upon employment security."'1' Decisions
involving advertising expenditures, product design, financing, and
sales have too remote and speculative an impact on job security. Distinguishing the employer's decision in Fibreboardto subcontract from
decisions to invest in labor-saving machinery or terminate a business,
Stewart stated:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and
the basic scope of the enterprise are not themselves primarily
about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment. 12
The Supreme Court considered the scope of mandatory bargaining
again in FirstNational Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 1" The employer
in that case supplied maintenance and cleaning services to commercial
customers in the New York City area. 130 A group of employees who

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.
452 U.S. 666 (1981).
Id. at 668.
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serviced a particular nursing home voted in a Board-sanctioned election
to be represented by a union. 131 Without bargaining with the newlyelected union, the employer terminated its service to the nursing home
and subsequently discharged all the employees. 1
Although it found no anti-union animus, the NLRB held that the
employer's decision to terminate its service and the effects of that
decision were mandatory subjects of bargaining.13 Thus, the employer
violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by failing to bargain in good
faith over those decisions. 134 The employer appealed the NLRB's finding that the decision to terminate service was a term or condition of
employment.lal The Second Circuit upheld the NLRB's ruling. The
Supreme Court held that an employer's decision to terminate part of
its business for purely economic reasons was outside the scope of
mandatory bargaining, and reversed the NLRB.136
The Court, in its analysis of the scope of mandatory bargaining,
identified three basic types of management decisions. Certain decisions, such as those involving promotional expenditures, product design and financing arrangements, "have only an indirect and attenuated
impact on the employment relationship" and thus fall outside the scope
of mandatory bargaining.1 37 Other decisions, such as those pertaining
to work rules and layoffs, have a direct and almost exclusive impact
on the employer-employee relationship. These types of decisions are
mandatory subjects.138 More troublesome for purposes of distinguishing
mandatory from non-mandatory subjects are those decisions that directly impact on employment and are primarily economic decisions
involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise. Decisions such as the one made by the employer in FirstNational Mainte13 9
izance to terminate part of a business fall into this category.
The Court acknowledged that decisions of this nature necessarily
implicate significant employee and employer interests. Nonetheless,
the Court avoided weighing these competing interests. Instead, it
stated that an employer should be required to bargain over such de-

131.
132.
133.

Id. at 669.
Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670-72.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 676-77.

138.
139.

Id. at 677.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

23

UNIVERSITY
OFReview,
FLORIDAVol.
LAW39,
REVIEW
Florida Law
Iss. 1 [1987],

Art. 1

[Vol. 39

cisions only if the benefit to labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process outweighs the burden placed on an employ140
er's ability to conduct business.

The Court balanced the employer's "need for unencumbered decision making" with the benefit to labor-management relations. The
Court recognized that a fundamental purpose of the Act was to promote industrial peace by bringing problems of vital concern to labor
and management within the collective bargaining framework established by Congress.'14 Yet, the Court stressed that management had
to be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent
necessary to run a profitable business.'4 The Court also noted that
business exigencies frequently required employers to act with speed,
flexibility, and secrecy. 4 3 Noting that the employer's decision in First
National Maintenance represented a significant change in operations,
the Court concluded that the employer's need to operate freely regarding an economic decision to terminate part of its business outweighed
the incremental benefit that might be gained through union participation in making such a decision.'"
C. Analysis of Drug Programsin the Context of ProfessionalSports
Under Existing Case Law
1. Application of National Labor Relations Board and
Lower Court Precedents
Neither Fibreboardnor FirstNationalMaintenanceclearly defines
the scope of mandatory bargaining. Fibreboard acknowledged that
certain employer decisions fall outside the statutory phrase "terms
and conditions." But the Court failed to articulate any clear rule under
which to evaluate those matters most likely to remain within an employer's entrepreneurial prerogative, such as decisions concerning
plant relocations, sales of business, and partial closings. FirstNational
Maintenance, on the other hand, established a rule for one class of
employer decisions but failed to establish any clear principle applicable
to other employer decisions."

5

140. Id. at 679.
141. Id. at 678-79.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 682-83.
144. Id. at 686.
145. For a similar critique of Fibreboardand FirstNat'l Maintenance, see Harper, supra
note 102, at 1453-56.
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The NLRB recently interpreted First National Maintenance in
Otis Elevator.146 In Otis, the employer decided to transfer some of its

work to another of its plants. Although the employer disregarded the
union while making this relocation decision, the NLRB upheld the
employer's unilateral action. In an extremely broad reading of First
National Maintenance, the NLRB held that all decisions affecting the
scope and direction of an enterprise are exempted from bargaining
147
and from the First National Maintenance Court's balancing test.
In the NLRB's opinion, only those decisions in which labor costs are
the determining factor would fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining. 148
The NLRB's holding in Otis that decisions affecting the scope and
direction of an enterprise are beyond the scope of bargaining is consistent with the Court's position in First National Maintenance and
Fibreboard.Other aspects of the NLRB's opinion, however, appear
to exceed the First National Maintenance and Fibreboardtests. For
example, limiting the scope of mandatory bargaining to those matters
involving labor costs could exclude decisions pertaining to work rules
and layoffs as well as other matters having a direct or exclusive impact
on the employer-employee relationship. Neither First National
Maintenance nor Fibreboard supports such a result. In addition, a
decision to transfer work does not necessarily affect the scope or
direction of an enterprise. These aspects of the Otis decision reflect
the difficulty in determining the scope of mandatory bargaining.
Despite the Court's inability to clearly define the scope of mandatory bargaining, the NLRB and lower courts have consistently held
certain subjects to be within the meaning of "terms and conditions of
'
employment."149
At least with respect to these particular subjects,
predictable rules have evolved. These rules appear to be consistent
with the Court's balancing test in FirstNational Maintenance as well
as the legislative history of section 8(d) of the Act.
Both the NLRB and the courts have interpreted "terms and conditions of employment" to include most provisions that deal with the
employer-employee relationship. 150 Thus, most rules that regulate how
employees perform their work are considered terms and conditions of
employment. Included in this category are several bargaining subjects

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
R. GORMAN, supra note 96, at 503-06.
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that bear some resemblance to the drug testing programs proposed
in the professional sports industry.
For example, decisions involving employee health and safety protection on the job are clearly mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 15 1 In his concurring opinion in Fibreboard,Justice Stewart stated:
"What one's hours are to be, what amount of work is expected during
those hours, what periods of relief are available, what safety practices
are observed, would all seem conditions of one's employment.' 1 52 Safety
considerations are such an important condition of employment that an
employer may not modify safety rules without first bargaining with
the union even when the employer is obligated by law to conform its
conduct to specific minimum safety standards.'15 Disciplinary rules are
also generally mandatory subjects of bargaining. Thus, it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to unilaterally implement systems of
discipline.'1 Similarly, an employer must bargain over the criteria for
demotion or a change in status of its employees.'5
The requirements of continued employment are perhaps the most
literal of "terms and conditions of employment." Accordingly, employer
decisions to terminate employees, like disciplinary rules, are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 156 An employer may not unilaterally establish the allowable causes of discharge or the grievance procedures
under which employer decisions involving discharges will be reviewed. 57 In fact, the scope of "requirements of continued employment" is not limited to discharges for cause. An employer is generally
obligated to bargain over other issues involving the tenure of its employees, including where and in what sequence layoffs occur and the
age for forced retirement. 15
In connection with disciplinary rules and terminations, various testing programs constitute "terms or conditions of employment" and are

151. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 831 (1967), enforced 408 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.
1969).
152. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 222.
153. NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1967).
154. See, e.g., Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 (1982) (modification of
practices established by consistent pattern of conduct may constitute a change in terms and
conditions of employment whether or not it is also a breach of contract).
155. E.g., United States Gypsum Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1965), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 393 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1968).
156. E.g., San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1985).
157. E.g., NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941).
158. E.g., First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677; Allied Chem. Workers Local 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971).
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thus mandatory bargaining topics. For example, the NLRB held that
an employer may not unilaterally institute a polygraph test requirement for its employees, if results of the test could be the basis for
disciplinary action or if refusal to submit to testing could result in
automatic discharge.159 Likewise, an employer cannot unilaterally implement mandatory physical examinations for its employees as part
of attendance control procedures either as a condition of continued
employment or if the results of the examinations could be the basis
for discharge. 160
The NLRB's treatment of each of these subjects suggests that
drug testing programs proposed by professional sports leagues constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining. Drug abuse in professional
sports clearly implicates valid employee safety concerns. The use of
drugs during an athletic contest endangers the safety of all players.
For example, amphetamines would tend to make players more intense
and more aggressive and, thus, would be hazardous to users as well
as non-users. Former major league pitcher Doc Ellis, who under the
influence of LSD pitched a no-hitter for the Pittsburgh Pirates, has
publicly admitted that he became more aggressive and frequently
threw at batters while on drugs. 161 Cocaine, which also increases a
person's heart rate, could presumably have a similar effect on players.
Injuries might also result from marijuana or any other drug that might
diminish a player's concentration during the contest.
The most controversial element of the proposed drug programs
has been mandatory random testing. In addition, these programs have
typically incorporated a system of progressive penalties for first, second, and third time offenders. The penalties include temporary suspension, suspension without pay, and permanent suspension. 162
The safety considerations associated with drug use, as well as the
disciplinary and testing aspects of the drug programs in professional
sports, suggest that these programs are mandatory bargaining topics.
An alternative argument exists, however, to compel bargaining over
drug programs. These programs appear to fall within the scope of
mandatory bargaining under the Supreme Court's balancing test in
First National Maintenance.

159.
160.
161.

Medicenter, Mid-South Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 670, 678 (1975).
CIBA-Geigy Pharmaceutical, 114 L.R.R.M. 3650, 3653 (3d Cir. 1983).
Letter from Doe Ellis to Ethan Lock (July 2, 1987) (on file at University of Florida

Law Review).
162. Under the NBA's current drug program, first offenders are suspended with pay,
second offenders are suspended without pay and third time offenders are suspended permanently.
See DRUG AGREEMENT BETWEEN NBAPA AND NBA, app. A (Oct. 1983).
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Application of Supreme Court Precedents
a.

Categories of Management Decisions

Of the three categories of management decisions identified by the
Court in FirstNationalMaintenance, the drug-testing programs proposed in professional sports more closely resemble that category of
management decisions almost exclusively affecting the employer-employee relationship than the type of economic decision primarily affecting a change in the scope or direction of the enterprise. As noted
above, the programs typically incorporate disciplinary measures affecting player job security and conditions of continued employment. In
an effort to justify the implementation of random drag testing, management expressed a belief that drug use by players will ultimately
undermine fan support and the financial survival of professional
sports. 163 Presumably, management would categorize a program designed to eliminate drug use as an economic decision primarily affecting
the scope and direction of the enterprise.
This categorization is untenable for two reasons. First, an attempt
to eliminate drug use in professional sports hardly constitutes a change
in the scope or direction of business in the same manner as do terminations, partial closings, or decisions to invest in labor-saving machinery. The institution of a league-wide drug testing program would
neither change the basic operation of a professional sports league nor
require a significant capital investment. Thus, a drug program simply
does not appear to be the type of management decision that lies at
the "core of entrepreneurial control."'16
Second, and perhaps more important, a decision to implement a
drug program does not appear to be the type of business exigency
that must remain outside the bargaining process in order to enable
management to run a profitable business. 65 Despite management's
concern that drugs are threatening the economic survival of professional sports, no evidence exists to support the theory that drug use
by professional athletes will have any short run economic impact on
professional sports leagues. To the contrary, industry revenues have
increased during the past decade.
Amphetamines, pain killers, and steroids have been a part of professional sports for many years. 66 More recently, street drugs have

163. See supra note 60.
164. See Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 223.
165. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682-83.
166. The use of amphetamines, pain killers, and steroids in professional sports is well knom.
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also become part of the industry. In 1985, a federal investigation
revealed widespread cocaine use among major league baseball
players.167 Rumors of cocaine use by NFL players also surfaced in
1985. Prior to the 1986 season, Cleveland Browns safety Don Rogers
died of a cocaine overdose.16 Stories of cocaine use in the NBA have
been well publicized for years. In 1985, several players were suspended
from NBA play because of their involvement with cocaine.169 Nonetheless, professional sports franchises appear to be flourishing economically. Gate receipts and television ratings are strong and each of the
three major professional sports leagues (NFL, MLB and NBA) has
publicly discussed the possibility of expansion in the near future.170
The tremendous increase in gate receipts and network and non-network television revenues during the past decade suggests that fans
have been indifferent to professional athletes' use of drugs.171 If
eliminating drug use is actually fundamental to the survival or basic
direction of professional sports leagues, these facts are difficult to
explain.

Many NFL teams have dispensed steroids to players to enable them to gain weight and get
stronger. The use of pain killers has been common in all sports to enable players to perform
while injured. Likewise, amphetamines have been dispensed to increase intensity and improve
performance. See, e.g., Hanson, Ex-User Sounds Warning, USA Today, Jan. 23, 1987, at C6,
col. 1.
167. In 1984 and 1985, more than 40 major league baseball players either admitted drug
use or were implicated in police investigations. Drug Case Roster, USA Today, Sept. 6, 1985,
at C5. In 1985, a federal investigation linked 13 players to cocaine use and revealed that major
league baseball's drug connection extended into the clubhouse. Angell, supra note 12, at 48-65;
Callahan, Baseball's Drug Scandal, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 26-28; Celender, Baseball's Drug
Connection Widens, USA Today, Sept. 10, 1985, at Al.
168. See Reilly, supra note 13, at 28-34.
169. See, e.g., Richmond, Richardson Flunks Drug Test, Bannedfrom NBA, Ariz. Republic, Feb. 2, 1986, at C-1; Lucas Fails Drug Test, Is Released, Ariz. Republic, Mar. 15, 1986,
at G-3.
170. Baseball's drug problems were well publicized. Nonetheless, MLB realized recordbreaking attendance in 1985 and 1986. Despite drug problems in the industry, all three major
sports have publicly discussed plans to expand. See, e.g., Forbes, Rozelle Feeling More Comfortable Discussing Expansion, USA Today, Dec. 3, 1985, at C4; Herberg, Phoenix Fourth on
List for Baseball Expansion, Ariz. Republic, Dec. 7, 1985, at E-1, E-6.
171. Between 1977 and 1981, each NFL team received approximately $6 million per year
from network television revenues. See WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS? BECAUSE WE ARE
THE GAME 11 (1981) (report to the members of the NFLPA) [hereinafter NFLPA REPORT].
The five year network agreement entered into in 1982 guaranteed each team approximately $14
million per year. Id. at 16. Similarly, Major League Baseball received approximately $41.5
million from network television in 1981, $58 million in 1983, and $160 million in 1984. Local and
cable television rights also increased. In 1981, Major League Baseball teams received a total of
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b. Analysis Under First National Maintenance
Balancing Test - Benefits to Labor-Management Relations
and Collective Bargaining
Drug testing programs also appear to fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining under the Supreme Court's balancing test in First
National Maintenance. The FirstNationalMaintenancetest requires
management to bargain if the benefits to labor-management relations
and the collective bargaining process outweigh the burden placed on
the employers' ability to conduct business.172 Admittedly, employers
have a legitimate interest in controlling employees' drug use. Yet, the
Court's language in First National Maintenance and the existence of
other employer remedies to control the use of drugs suggest that the
benefits derived from collective bargaining outweigh management's
need to take unencumbered or unilateral actions.
The First NationalMaintenance court noted that the fundamental
goal of the NLRA was to promote industrial peace. 73 Designating
certain matters as "mandatory subjects of bargaining" helps achieve
industrial peace by bringing problems of vital concern to labor and
management within the bargaining framework established by Congress.174 In the Court's opinion, collective bargaining results in better
decisions for labor, management, and society as a whole. The Court's
opinion presumes the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to
resolution through the bargaining process. 175
The First National Maintenance Court concluded that decisions
"essential for the running of a profitable business" are not amenable
to collective bargaining.76 These types of decisions are excluded from
collective bargaining to protect the employer's right to determine the
scope and direction of its enterprise.'7 Unlike decisions affecting the
scope or direction of an enterprise, however, drug programs require

$48.4 million in local and cable television revenue. In 1984, teams received a total of almost
$105 million. See Lock, Salary IncreasesUnderMLB's System of FinalOffer Salary Arbitration,
2 LAB. LAW. 801, 811 (1986) (citing various cases of broadcasting). The NFL has maintained
near capacity attendance while MLB's attendance has steadily increased in recent years. In
1985, MLB set a single season attendance record by drawing 46,838,819 fans. That record was
broken in 1986 when MLB drew 47,500,347 fans. Attendance Mark, USA Today, Oct. 7, 1986,

at C1, col. 1.
172.
173.
174.

FirstNat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 677-78.

175. Id.at 678.
176. Id.at 678-79.
177.

Id. at 677.
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neither swift nor unilateral action. As noted above, drug use by professional athletes appears to have had no immediate impact on industry
revenues. In addition, the implementation of a drug program neither
requires an investment of capital nor changes the basic direction of
an enterprise.
At the same time, drug use is clearly a problem of vital concern
to labor and management. Without minimizing management's interest
in controlling drug use, it is inaccurate and patronizing to suggest
that drug use by athletes is a "vital concern" only for management.
Drug use by players clearly implicates legitimate health and safety
concerns.
Drugs can also have a significant economic impact on players. Although average yearly salaries in professional sports exceed average
salaries in most other industries, 178 professional athletes have relatively
short careers. The average career in the NFL, for example, is approximately four and one-half years. 179Drug use could conceivably shorten
a player's career by contributing to injury, eroding the player's skills
or subjecting the player to suspension or expulsion from the league.
A one-year suspension or an injury that shortens a player's career by
one year reduces an average career by almost twenty-five percent.
Obviously, drug use can have a tremendous impact on a player's career
earning potential. Thus, the subject of drugs is a "vital concern" for
players.
In addition, current practice in the industry suggests that drug
programs is a topic amenable to collective bargaining. In both Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, the Court acknowledged
that current labor practice was not a "binding guide" for courts to
determine the scope of mandatory bargaining. 180 Nonetheless, the
Courts cited industry practice as an indication of what was feasible
through collective bargaining. The FibreboardCourt noted that employer decisions to subcontract had long been viewed as matters particularly well-suited for resolution within the structure of collective
bargaining. Furthermore, the industrial practice of bargaining over
this type of decision demonstrated the "amenability of such subjects
to the collective bargaining process."''

178. The average MLB salary in 1984 was $329,408 (source: MLBPA). The average NFL
salary in 1985 was $193,000 (source: NFLPA).
179. In 1981, the NFLPA estimated that the average NFL career was approximately 4.6
years. NFLPA REPORT, supra note 167, at 4.
180. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 684.
181. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 210-15.
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The Court in FirstNational Maintenance also cited industry practice to support its finding that termination decisions fell outside the
scope of mandatory bargaining. The Court noted that provisions giving
unions the right to participate in the decisionmaking process concerning alteration of the scope of an enterprise were relatively rare. This
evidence, in the Court's opinion, weighed against mandatory bargaining.1S

In 1983, the NBA and the National Basketball Players' Association
(NBPA) jointly drafted and adopted a drug program that incorporated
testing procedures, counseling for players with drug problems, and 1a
system of progressive discipline. That agreement is still in effect. 3
Likewise, the Major League Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA)
and the Major League Baseball Players' Relations Committee
(MLBPRC) adopted a joint drug agreement in 1984.184 Even the NFL
and NFLPA addressed the issue of drug use in the 1982 collective
bargaining agreement.l MLB and NFL owners, dissatisfied with the
agreements pertaining to drug use, have attempted to unilaterally
replace these agreements with new drug programs. 8 6 Yet, the prior
agreements, especially the NBA and NBPA agreement, suggest that
the subject of drugs is amenable to collective bargaining.
c.

Analysis Under First National Maintenance Balancing Test Management's Interest

Under the FirstNationalMaintenance balancing test, the benefits
to the collective bargaining process must be weighed against management's right to protect its investment and unilaterally determine the
scope or direction of its enterprise.18 7 Although drug use appears to
have no short term impact on industry revenues, and drug programs
do not affect the fundamental operation of an enterprise, employers
have a legitimate interest in the quality of their employee's job performance. Whether that interest gives an employer the right to unilaterally adopt a drug testing program, however, is debatable.
The NLRA imposes a duty to bargain over many subjects about
which employers have legitimate reasons for wanting to bargain. Thus,

182. FirstNat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 684.
183. See DRUG AGREEMENT BETWEEN NBAPA AND NBA, app. A (Oct. 1983).
184. See JOINT DRUG AGREEMENT BETVEEN MLBPA AND MLB PLAYER RELATIONS
COmMITTEE, app. B (May 24, 1984).
185. See supra note 38.
186. See supra notes 47, 55-56 & 64 (NFL) and notes 14 & 18 (ILB).
187. FirstNat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679.
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Fibreboardrequired the employer to bargain over a decision to "contract out" even though the employer had a legitimate economic interest
in making its decision.'-' In Medicenter, the NLRB ruled that polygraph testing was a mandatory subject of bargaining, even though
the employer had legitimate concerns over vandalism. The employer's
interest in detecting and preventing illegal activity did not justify its
refusal to bargain.189 Similarly, the Third Circuit in CIBA-Geigy Pharnaceutical found that physical examinations were a mandatory subject
despite employer claims that testing was necessary to meet production
schedules.9
Even assuming that an employer's interest in maximizing job performance permits the employer to unilaterally adopt a drug program,
the unique nature of the professional sports industry distinguishes
sports franchise owners from employers in other industries. Within
the context of professional sports, an owner's need for unilateral action
with regard to drug testing is diminished by the availability of other
remedies. Because of the collective nature of athletic contests, unions
and players recognize that a player's value to any particular team
depends not only on the player's skill level, but also on the nature of
the skills and the player's attitude, conduct, age, and relationship with
teammates. 91 Thus, the employment relationship in professional sports
presumes that teams retain the discretion to make necessary personnel
changes in search of the right combination of talent, attitude, and
192
leadership to produce a winning team.
Teams typically retain broad powers to terminate a player's employment under the Standard Player Contract. Paragraph 11 of the
NFL Player Contract, for example, allows the team to terminate a
player's contract at any time if, in the sole judgment of the team, the
player's skill is unsatisfactory as compared with other players or if
the player has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by the
club to adversely affect or reflect on the team.' 93 The standard MLB

188. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 211.
189. Medicenter, 331 N.L.R.B. at 676.
190. CIBA-Geigy, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3635.
191. J. WEISTART, THE LAW OF SPORTS, 245-46 (1979).
192. Id. Two parties frequently agree that one party will have the discretion to make
certain decisions affecting their contractual relationship. See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 644-46 (1960).
193. NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, §§ 11:
Player understands that he is competing with other players for a position on
Club's roster within the applicable player limits. If at any time, in the sole judgment of Club, Player's skill or performance has been unsatisfactory as compared
with that of other players competing for positions on Club's roster, or if Player
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and NBA player contracts contain similar provisions.19

In light of this wide range of discretion, a player will not be able
to challenge a team's
observe club rules or
or conduct need only
club, the team is not

decision to terminate the player for failure to
for lack of skill. Since a player's performance
be unsatisfactory in the sole judgment of the
obligated to support personnel decisions with

objective proof.195 Each team may exercise unfettered discretion to
terminate any players using or suspected of using drugs.
Admittedly, the use of drugs might be a league-wide problem that
ultimately requires a league-wide solution. Nonetheless, since teams
can unilaterally rid themselves of players with drug problems, owners
need not take immediate, unilateral league-wide action. To the extent

has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect
or reflect on Club, then Club may terminate this contract.
Id.
194. Unlike NFL players, MLB players and NBA players have some salary protection if
terminated for lack of skill.
The NBA contract allows the team to terminate the player if
at any time, [the player] fail[s], in the sole opinion of the Club's management, to
exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to qualify to continue as a member
of the Club's team provided, however, that if this contract is terminated by the
Club, in accordance with the provisions of this subparagraph, during the period
from the fifty-sixth day after the first game of any schedule season of the Association through the end of such schedule season, the Player shall be entitled to
receive his full salary for said season.
NBA UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, 20(b)(2).
The MLB contract states:
The Club may terminate this contract upon written notice to the Player (but only
after requesting and obtaining waivers of this contract from all other Major League
Clubs) if the Player shall at any time: fail, in the opinion of the Club's management,
to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to qualify or continue as a member
of the Club's team.
MLB UNIFORM PLAYER'S CONTRACT, 7(b)(2).
If this contract is terminated by the Club, the Player shall be entitled to termination pay under the circumstances and in the amounts set forth in Article VIII of
the Basic Agreement between the Major League Clubs and the Major League
Baseball Players Association, effective January 1, 1980.
MLB UNIFORM PLAYER'S CONTRACT, 7(c). Article VIII, § C states:
[a) Player whose Contract is terminated by a Club during the championship season
under paragraph 7(b)(2) of the Uniform Player's Contract for failure to exhibit
sufficient skill or competitive ability, shall be entitled to receive termination pay
from the Club in an amount equal to the unpaid balance of the full salary stipulated
in paragraph 2 of his Contract for that season.
Article VIII, § C, Basic Agreement between MLB and MLBPA (1980).
195. J. WEISTART, supra note 191, at 24447 (1979).
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that owners perceive drug use as a public relations cancer likely to
undermine fan support or destroy the league, each owner has a remedy
with respect to individual drug users, pending negotiation with the
union of a league-wide program.
An individual team owner will usually become aware of drug problems on the team before the fans or media do. Occasionally, however,
a team owner might not learn of an individual player's problem until
the public does. This undoubtedly has been true in the case of some
player arrests. In either case, the owner can communicate the team's
position on drug use by taking immediate action and terminating that
player's contract. Thus, no business exigency exists to justify unilateral
action by management.
Moreover, team owners historically delegate to the league commissioner significant authority over player discipline, disputes between
players and teams, and inter-team controversies. 19 Although players'
associations have, through collective bargaining, successfully reduced
the scope of the commissioners' role in player-team disputes, 197 league
commissioners have uniformly retained the right to fine or suspend
players for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence
in, the sport.198
Paragraph 15 of the NFL Player Contract, for example, permits
the commissioner to fine or suspend the player or terminate his contract if the player
[a]ccepts a bribe or agrees to throw or fix an NFL game; fails
to promptly report a bribe offer or an attempt to throw or fix
an NFL game; bets on an NFL game; knowingly associates
with gamblers or gambling activity; uses or provides other
players with stimulants or other drugs for the purpose of attempting to enhance on-field performance; or is guilty of any
other form of conduct reasonably judged by the League Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or professional football ....
9
The procedural requirements for commissioner action under paragraph
15 are outlined in article VIII of the 1982 collective bargaining agree-

ment.2'0

196. Id. at 440-41.
197. Id. at 442. The Commissioner's power has, in many instances, been replaced by dispute
resolution systems under which independent arbitrators resolve disputes.
198. See, e.g., 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 19, art. VIII
(1982).
199.

NFL

200.

1982

PLAYER CONTRACT,

15.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
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The NFL Commissioner, through the power granted to him under
the integrity-of-the-game clause contained in the NFL Player Contract, appears to be well-suited to deal with isolated instances of
misconduct that threaten the integrity of the game. In 1983, NFL
Commissioner Rozelle suspended Baltimore Colts quarterback Art
Schlichter for two years for gambling. 2 1 The same year, Rozelle suspended Ross Browner, Pete Johnson, E. J. Junior, and Greg Stemrick
for four games because of their involvement with cocaine. 2 2 None of
these suspensions was challenged by the NFLPA and all seemed to
be appropriate situations for Commissioner Rozelle to invoke his powers under paragraph 15 of the Player Contract and article VIII of the
collective bargaining agreement. Yet the appropriateness of commissioner action in these instances hardly legitimizes league-wide action
by the commissioner. In fact, the ability of the commissioner to discipline known drug users further reduces the need for unilateral adoption
of a league-wide drug program.
D.

Analysis of Drug Programsin Context of Professional Sports
Under Product Market Theory
1.

Application of Product Market Theory

One year after the First National Maintenance decision, Michael
Harper published an article in the Virginia Law Review that attempted
to clarify the scope of mandatory bargaining. 20 3 The article reconciled
the FirstNational Maintenance decision with a clear but limited principle that could be predictably and uniformly applied to all bargaining
cases. Harper proposed to exclude from compulsory bargaining all
employer decisions that determine the nature, quantity, pricing, and
24
marketing of products. 0
To support his product market theory, Harper argued that prohibiting employees from exerting any direct control over the product market was consistent with the NLRA. 20 5 In addition, Harper cited a
strong social policy, not subordinated by the NLRA, in favor of allowing consumers to decide which goods employers produce by expressing
their preference in the marketplace.206 Consumers, not employees,

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Keteyian, The Straight-ArrowAddict, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 10, 1986, at 74-79.
See supra note 40.
Harper, supra note 102, at 1447.
Id. at 1450.
Id.
Id. at 1464.
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should influence management's product market decisions. °7 Unlike the
First National Maintenance test, Harper's product market theory
was based on the desirability of insulating product market decisions
from the collective bargaining process rather than weighing employer
203
and collective bargaining interests.
Whatever the merits of Harper's product market theory in the
normal industrial setting, the theory conflicts with the purposes of
the NLRA when applied to employees whose performance is the marketed product. For example, the NLRB and the courts have consistently held that safety concerns are conditions of employment within
the meaning of the NLRA and, thus, are mandatory subjects of bargaining.219 The product market theory, however, excludes safety issues
from mandatory bargaining in situations where employee risk formed
part of the product. 210 As a result, this theory would have a dramatic
impact on the scope of collective bargaining in the professional sports
industry.
The following examples of rules and rule changes illustrate the
impact of the product market theory on bargaining in professional
football. A current NFL rule prevents wide receivers from cutting
inside after the play starts and blocking a defender in the back or the
side. 21' The crack-back block, as this maneuver is called, is illegal
because of the danger of serious injury if one player with a running
start is permitted to blind side another player. Another league rule
designed to prevent serious injury penalizes players for blocking below
212
the waist on kickoffs.
NFL rules also protect quarterbacks, kickers, and punt returners,
presumably because they are vulnerable as stationary targets. Thus,
an official should, according to league rules, end a play before a quar23
terback is actually tackled if he is "in the grasp" of a defender. 1 Punt
returners can signal for a "fair catch" when receiving a punt, to elimi24
nate the possibility of getting hit by a defender running full speed. 1
Likewise, a defender cannot collide with kickers or punters once they

207. Id.
208. Id. at 1464 n.70.
209. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
210. Harper, supra note 102, at 1466.
211. OFFICIAL 1986 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
OF RULES 334-38 (1986).
212. Id. at 338.
213. Id. at 337.
214. Id. at 338.
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have actually kicked the unblocked ball. 215 Finally, current rules only
allow defensive backs to have contact with receivers within five yards
of the line of scrimmage.216 This rule replaced the old "bump and run"
rule, which permitted defensive backs to hit receivers downfield as
frequently as they wished until the ball was in the air.
Assume that, on the basis of a nationwide survey, the NFL concludes that fans want to see an increase in violence and aggressiveness
on the field. Accordingly, the NFL unilaterally eliminates all rules
protecting quarterbacks, kickers, and punt returners and legalizes the
crack-back block and the bump and run. Harper suggests that the
NLRB should not require football franchise owners to bargain over
rule changes affecting the level of violence in football if violence is
part of the product sold to fans. 217 Harper would argue that these rule
changes are actually product design changes and should be excluded
from mandatory bargaining regardless of the impact on player safety.
Arguably, all rule changes in professional sports are product design
changes. Thus, under the product market theory, the owners could
take the position that an increase in the length of games constitutes
a change in the design of the product. Likewise, the NFL could unilaterally require all teams to install artificial turf either to increase the
speed of the game or to enhance aesthetic appeal on television. This
would be permissible despite the fact that artificial turf may increase
the frequency and severity of player injuries. A literal application of
the product market theory would exclude even absurd rules from the
scope of mandatory bargaining. For example, the owners could adopt
a rule preventing quarterbacks from wearing helmets, on the theory
that recognition, identity, good looks, and competitiveness were part
of the product.
Admittedly, management is unlikely to adopt an anti-helmet rule
for quarterbacks. Nonetheless, the product theory excludes other, less
absurd rule changes that management might adopt. These rule changes
may have a significant impact on player safety. Harper offers no
criteria upon which to limit employer discretion involving product
design, regardless of the significance of the employee interest. Thus,
the product market theory could, within the context of professional
sports, eliminate from the scope of mandatory bargaining all subjects
except wages and other economic benefits.

215.
216.
217.

Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 336.
Harper, supra note 102, at 1466.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss1/1

38

Lock: TheNFL
Legality
thePROGRAM
National Labor Regultions Act of Attempts
DRUGUnder
TESTING

Despite Harper's argument that consumers rather than employees
should influence management's product decisions, nothing in the
NLRA suggests that the interests of those employees whose performance is the marketed product should be subordinated to consumer
or employer interests. Matters involving employee safety, systems of
discipline, and conditions of continued employment are normally within
the scope of mandatory bargaining. 21s Safety, discipline, and job tenure
concerns are at least as critical to athletes as they are to industrial
employees. Thus, sports franchise owners should, like other employers,
be required to bargain over those matters. Harper provides little
authority to support the position that any management group should
be relieved of this obligation or, conversely, that any group of employees
has fewer rights under the NLRA than normal industrial employees.
Additionally, Harper's product market theory is inconsistent with
existing NLRB and court decisions within the sports industry. Although labor disputes and collective bargaining are currently an integral part of professional sports, the emergence of players' associations
is a relatively new phenomenon.219 Thus, applying federal labor laws
to the sports industry has been a recent development. Nonetheless,
there have been disputes involving the scope of mandatory bargaining.
The resolution of these disputes suggests that neither the NLRB nor
the courts has been willing to subordinate player interests to employer
decisions that implicate both terms and conditions of employment, and
product design changes.
2. Sports Industry Precedents
a.

Bench Fine Rule and Installation of Artificial Turf Case

On March 25, 1971, the NFL owners adopted a new rule stating
that "any player leaving the bench area while a fight is in progress

218. E.g., Atlas Microfilming, 267 N.L.R.B. 682 (1983); Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260
N.L.R.B. 659 (1982).

219. Unions and collective bargaining are relatively new phenomena in the sports industry.
Although players' associations began to emerge in the 1950s, initially these associations were
loosely operated and relatively weak compared to current associations. The MLBPA was formed
in 1954 but did not have a full-time executive director until 1966 when it hired Marvin Miller.
The National Basketball Players' Association, organized in the early 1950s, was an informal

organization until 1962 when it hired Larry Fleisher as General Counsel. Although the National
Hockey League Players' Association was formed in the mid 1950s, the National Hockey League
did not formally recognize the association as the official bargaining representative of the players
until 1967. The NFLPA was not formally recognized by the NFL until 1968. For a detailed
history of collective bargaining in professional sports, see SOBEL, supra note 17, ch. 4.
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on the field will be fined $200."0 The Commissioner, who was charged
with investigating violations of this rule and imposing fines, fined 106
players during the 1971 exhibition season for violating the "bench fine"
rule. The union claimed the rule was improperly adopted, and filed a
grievance with the Commissioner under the non-injury grievance
clause of the collective bargaining agreement.2' The Commissioner
questioned the union's authority to challenge the fines. Subsequently,
the union withdrew its grievance and filed an unfair labor practice
charge, alleging that the NFLMC and its member clubs refused to
bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally implementing the
new rule.?
The NFLPA filed another unfair labor practice charge against management in 1971. In January, 1971, the union became aware of a study
suggesting that artificial turf might be responsible for an increasing
number of injuries to football players.2 The union subsequently sought
management's cooperation in connection with a further study on the
impact of artificial turf. On November 11, 1971, the union formally
demanded both bargaining and a moratorium on future installations
of artificial turf. In the meantime, five clubs installed artificial turf in
1971. In addition, the Kansas City Chiefs were scheduled to move,
prior to the 1972 season, into a new stadium containing artificial turf.
Two other clubs, the New York Giants and Buffalo Bills, announced
plans for the installation of artificial turf in stadiums to be constructed
in the future.
Management denied that it had an obligation to bargain about the
installation of artificial turf during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement. However, management agreed to engage in general discussions with the union in the interest of maintaining a good relationship.? The union rejected management's suggestion to refer the matter to the contractual joint committee, presumably because the joint
committee had no authority to negotiate.225 On December 10, 1971,
the union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that management refused to bargain over the future installation of artificial turf.?' G

220.
958, 958
221.
222.
223.
958, 958
224.
225.
226.

NFLMC and Constituent Member Clubs of the NFL and NFLPA (I), 203 N.L.R.B.
(1973).
Id.
NLRB Case No. 18-CA-3380.
NFLMC and Constituent Member Clubs of the NFL and NFLPA (I), 203 N.L.R.B.
(1973).
Id.
Id. at 958-59.
Id. (charges filed in NLRB Case No. 18-CA-3437).
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A complaint was issued on both charges on May 12, 1972, and
hearings commenced before an administrative law judge on June 20,
1972.227 The judge found that the owners' unilateral implementation
of the bench fine rule violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. However,
the judge concluded that management's conduct concerning the artificial turf charge did not constitute a refusal to bargain, and he dismissed
that portion of the complaint.2 The judge's decision on the merits of
these charges was less significant than his analysis of management's
obligation to bargain over both topics.
At the hearing, management suggested that the installation of
artificial turf was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, and rhetorically asked the judge: "If artificial turf is to be declared a mandatory
subject of bargaining, would the dome of the astrodome likewise be
a mandatory subject? If the earth below is mandatory, is the sky
above, and what about the sides?"22 The judge had little difficulty
distinguishing artificial turf from floors of a plant. The ceilings, walls,
and floors of a plant are usually so remotely connected to a worker's
conditions of employment that these items are not typically mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 30 The football playing surface, however, is
clearly a condition of employment, especially if one surface is less
conducive to injuries than other surfaces.231 Similarly, the judge concluded that the bench fine rule was unquestionably a mandatory subject of bargaining. The fines represented a reduction in salary, even
if only a conditional reduction for specified conduct.212
Both parties filed exceptions to the administrative law judge's decision. The NLRB heard oral argument on March 5, 1973, and issued
a decision on May 30, 1973.m The NLRB found that the Commissioner,
instead of the owners, implemented the bench fine rule, and thus
dismissed that portion of the complaint.2 The eighth circuit in reversing concluded that the owners adopted the rule and it constituted a
unilateral change in a condition of employment.2 5 Regarding the artificial turf charge, the NLRB agreed with the administrative law judge
that the NFLMC had not refused to bargain over the installation of

227.
228.
229.
2 30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2431.

Id.

2:32.
233.
234.
2835.

Id. at 961-62.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 959.
NFLPA v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974).
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artificial turf.23 The NLRB specifically stated, however, that artificial
237
turf was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
b.

Overtime and Punt Rules Case

In the spring of 1974, the NFLMC unilaterally adopted ten new
rules.23 The NFLPA maintained that two of the new rules, the sudden
death or overtime rule and the punt rule, involved conditions of employment. Therefore, management's unilateral adoption of those rules
amounted to a refusal to bargain, in violation of section 8(a)(5).23 The
union filed an unfair labor practice charge and on June 9, 1975, the
NLRB issued a consolidated complaint containing several unfair labor
practice charges. 40 Hearings before an administrative law judge were
held from August 11 through December 15, 1975.241

The NFLPA opposed the overtime and punt rules because of the
impact these rules had on working hours and player safety. 42 The
sudden death overtime rule, which eliminated tie games at the end
of regulation play, extended the players' working hours and prolonged
243
the period of time during which players were exposed to injury.
The league designed the punt rule to increase the number and proficiency of punt returns.2 This rule prohibited players on the kicking
team from going beyond the line of scrimmage until the ball was
kicked, and increased the players' exposure to injury.?45
Management, on the other hand, contended that these changes
were made in response to fan interest for more exciting play.246 In

other words, the rules were adopted to improve the game's audience
appeal. The NFLMC argued that the rule changes represented changes

236. NFLMC and Constituent Member Clubs of the NFL and NFLPA (I), 203 N.L.R.B.
958, 959-60 (1973).
237. Id. at 959.
238. See H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 469 (1976).
239. After the rules were adopted, the NFLMC advised the NFLPA of its willingness to
discuss the effects of any of the rules. See Administrative Law Judge's Opinion at 27-32, NFLMC
and Constituent Member Clubs and NFLPA (II), NLRB Case No. 2-CA-13379 (June 30, 1976).
For text of administrative law judge's opinion, see JD-405-76 New York or H.R. REP. No.
1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 465-521 (1976). Unlike in NFLMC (I), the parties entered into a
settlement agreement as part of the collective bargaining agreement executed on March 1, 1977.
240. NLRB Case No. 2-CA-13379.
241. Id. at 466.
242. Id. at 486-87.
243. Id. at 487.
244. Id. at 486.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 487.
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in the design or development of the product, and thus were exclusively
7
a management prerogative.2
The administrative law judge issued a decision on June 30, 1976,
and found that management's conduct did not constitute a refusal to
bargain. 81 Although the rule changes were adopted in the spring of
1974, the judge noted that management had, in a letter dated May
24, invited the union to bargain over the effects of the rule changes.? 9
Since the rules were not to be implemented until players went to
training camp in July, the judge concluded that the players' association
had ample opportunity to bargain before the rules were put into effect. 2 0 The judge did conclude, however, that the rule changes were
mandatory bargaining subjects.2 1
The administrative law judge acknowledged that employers are
not required to bargain over all decisions that have an impact on
conditions of employment. Citing Fibreboard,the judge noted that
the employer has complete control over those decisions involving a
commitment of investment capital or a change in the basic scope or
direction of the corporate enterprise.? 2 In addition, the judge found
some merit in the NFLMC's position that the playing rules were
similar to the design of a product.
Nonetheless, the administrative law judge cited the NLRB's earlier
decision on the artificial turf issue and concluded that the length of
time players perform as well as their exposure to injury were, like
the type of surface on which they played, mandatory subjects of bargaining.' - The judge admitted that this conclusion arguably deprived
management of entrepreneurial control equal to that of other employers. Yet, the judge found that "the deprivation is one attributable to
the requirements of the statute."
c.

Footwear Case

The scope of "terms and conditions of employment" was at issue
in another unfair labor practice charge filed in 1979 by the North

247. Id.
248.
249.
250.
251.
2,52.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 490.
at 489-90.
at 490.
at 488.
at 488-89.
at 489.
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American Soccer League Players' Association (NASLPA).25 In that
case, the NASLPA alleged that the North American Soccer League
(NASL) violated its obligation to bargain with the exclusive bargaining
representative of the players, by entering into contracts with individual players and unilaterally changing various conditions of employment.2 7 Among those unilateral changes adopted by the league was
a rule requiring players to obtain permission from their respective
teams before wearing footwear other than that selected by the team.2
The NLRB issued complaints and requested temporary relief under
section 10(j) pending the final disposition of the unfair labor practice
charges.- 9 The district court granted injunctive relief on behalf of the
NASLPA and, on October 6, 1980, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's order. 260 The NLRB has consistently held that unilateral
changes concerning dress codes or uniform policies constitute changes
in terms and conditions of employment. 261 Within the context of professional sports, a player's footwear, like the uniform, is arguably an
aspect of the design of the product. Nonetheless, the NLRB and the
district and circuit courts each concluded that the rule regarding footwear amounted to a unilateral change in a condition of employment..212
Decisions concerning artificial turf as well as rule changes such as
overtime and punt return rules implicate employee safety concerns.
Arguably, rules designed to limit fighting or restrict the type of footwear are less objectionable from an employee's standpoint. Nonetheless, even rules of this nature fall within the scope of mandatory
bargaining. These cases clearly indicate that neither the NLRB nor
the courts have been willing to subordinate player interests with respect to those changes in product design that implicate either safety
or disciplinary concerns.
3.

Product Image

Despite the above cases, management's interest in controlling drug
use can be distinguished from its interest in playing surfaces and the
rules of the game. A drug program is not part of product design in

256.
632 F.2d
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Morio v. North Am. Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), Qffd,
217 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Morio v. North Am. Soccer League, 632 F.2d 217, 218 (2d Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., Transportation Enters., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 551 (1979).
Morio, 632 F.2d at 218.
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the same manner that rules and playing surfaces represent aspects of
product design. Drug use by players is arguably an aspect of product
image rather than product design.
The exclusion from mandatory bargaining of those management
decisions that affect the image of a product is perhaps the most appealing application of Harper's product market theory within the context
of professional sports. Harper suggests that employer decisions concerning the identity and behavior of employees, like product design
decisions, should remain outside the scope of mandatory bargaining
when the identity and behavior of the employees define the marketed
product. 26 Employers should not have to bargain over product image
or quality. Employers should, according to Harper, be able to unilat2
erally set personnel standards that define the product. 6
Authority exists to support the position that decisions that affect
the image and quality of an employer's product should be excluded
from the scope of mandatory bargaining. In Newspaper Guild of
GreaterPhiladelphia,Local 10, v. NLRB, 26 a publisher attempted to
unilaterally institute an ethics code that restricted its employees from
participating in certain community or political activities and from receiving gifts from protected news sources. The stated purposes of the
code were to maintain the paper's standards of integrity and objectivity
and to protect its quality and credibility. 266 The union claimed that
the code was a condition of employment and filed an unfair labor
practice charge after management refused to bargain over the matter.2 "7
The administrative law judge ruled that the code was a mandatory
bargaining subject and ordered the employer to bargain. 2 8 The NLRB
agreed that the employer had a duty to bargain over the penalty
provisions of the code but held that the employer had no duty to
bargain over the code's substantive provisions. The penalty provisions
affected employment security and fell within the scope of mandatory
bargaining. In the NLRB's opinion, however, the code itself represented the newspaper's attempt to preserve the quality of its pub29
lication. It was, therefore, a management prerogative. 6

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Harper, supra note 102, at 1467.
Id. at 1467-68.
636 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

45

UNIVERSITY
FLORIDAVol.
LAW
Florida LawOF
Review,
39,REVIEW
Iss. 1 [1987],

Art. 1

[Vol. 39

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the NLRB's distinction
between a decision to institute a code and the penalties under the
code. In its opinion, these matters were inseparable. Both were either
mandatory or non-mandatory subjects of bargaining.20 At least with
respect to news publications, however, the court recognized the nonmandatory nature of image and quality concerns. 1 It found that credibility was a central element of the newspaper's ultimate product
and, relying on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard,
concluded that the protection of a paper's editorial integrity lay "at
' 22
the core of publishing control. ' 7
In a footnote to its decision, the Newspaper Guild court specifically
'declined to consider whether credibility and integrity were as fundamental to the scope of commercial enterprises not possessing the special characteristics of a news publication. 273 Yet an argument of this
nature is not untenable. Within the context of professional sports,
professional athletes are clearly identified by the public with the product that is being marketed by professional sports leagues. Presumably,
sports franchise owners would argue that drug use by professional
athletes affects the quality and image of the product offered to the fans.
Ironically, management has contributed to the use of drugs in
professional sports. Drugs and alcohol have for many years been associated with the industry. Breweries advertise heavily in professional
sports. Beer is sold at most athletic stadiums and athletes frequently
appear in beer commercials.? 4 More significantly, teams have historically used and abused amphetamines, painkillers, cortisone, and
steroids.275 As recently as 1986, Commissioner Rozelle specifically
stated that his proposed drug testing program would not include testing for steroids.-6
In addition, management's attempts to publicly pressure players
to accept random drug testing fosters the image of professional athletes
as drug users. There have, of course, been several instances of drug
abuse by individual athletes. 2 Nonetheless, many athletes do not use
drugs, and resent both management's and the public's perception of

270. Id. at 564.
271. Id. at 560.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 560 n.34.
274. Coors, Budweiser, and Miller advertise on NFL telecasts. Miller, in particular, uses
professional athletes and ex-professional athletes in its commercials.
275. See supra note 166.
276. See Drug Tests Will Help Clean Up ProSports, USA Today, July 15, 1986, at 10A.
277. See, e.g., supra notes 40-42 & 56 and accompanying text.
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athletes as drug abusers. Fans and the media interpret the players'
refusal to accept testing as evidence that players either have something
to hide or feel that drug abuse is not a serious problem.
Regardless of management's contribution to the presence of drugs
in the industry and the public's perception of athletes as drug users,
management clearly has a legitimate right to protect the image and
quality of professional sports. Yet this right to protect its product
does not necessarily give management the right to unilaterally implement a drug testing program. As noted above, management typically
has the ability under the standard player contract to protect the image
of the game by terminating drug users' contracts.? 8 Additionally, drug
use involves significant employee interests as well as image concerns.
Thus, unilateral action is justified only when management must act
immediately in order to protect its product. Since drug use in professional sports has had no immediate impact on industry revenues,' 9
there appears to be no reason to relieve management of its obligation
to bargain over this subject.
Finally, no evidence exists to suggest that drug testing will eliminate drug use in professional sports or change the image of professional
athletes as drug users. The owners' argument that testing will deter
drug use might have some validity. But cocaine leaves the body within
a few days of use.? Thus, unless tests are conducted every few days,
players with drug problems will be inclined to use drugs immediately
after being tested.2'
E. Effects Bargaining
Management's most persuasive argument to exclude drug programs
from the scope of mandatory bargaining is that players' drug use
affects the image and quality of the product offered to the market.
Thus, drug testing is a matter that lies at the core of entrepreneurial
control. As noted above, various factors, including the existence of
other employee remedies, weaken the argument. Regardless of the
validity of its argument, however, management may still have an
obligation to bargain over the type of program currently proposed in
professional sports. A determination that drug programs are not man-

278.
279.
280.
281.

See, e.g., supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167 & 171 and accompanying text.
See Stile, supra note 9.
Bias was tested prior to the NBA draft in June; Rogers was tested at the Browns

mini-camp in Mlay as part of the team's pre-season physical.
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datory bargaining subjects will not necessarily relieve management of
its obligation to bargain over the effects of those programs.
The Court and the NLRB have held that an employer's right to
take unilateral action with respect to non-mandatory bargaining subjects does not permit the employer to unilaterally control the effects
of that action. The NLRB's conclusion in First National Maintenance that the employer had an obligation to bargain over both its
decision to terminate and the effects of that decision indicate that the
NLRB recognized a distinction between these two types of employer
decisions.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court also recognized this distinction.2 4 Although it held that the decision to close the plant was not
a mandatory subject, the Court found that the employer did have an
obligation to bargain over the effects of that decision.
The Court cited its own language in Fibreboardwhere it observed
that section 8(d) covered terminations of employment that resulted
from closing an operation.2 The Court also noted that the union must
be given the opportunity to bargain over terminations resulting from
closings as part of the effects bargaining mandated by section 8(a)(5).YS
Because it had a legitimate interest in matters of job security, the
union was entitled to offer concessions, information, or alternatives
to management in an attempt to forestall or prevent the termination
of jobs.2
The NLRB reached a similar result in Newspaper Guild.' 9 In that
case, the NLRB found that the employer was obligated to bargain
over the penalties imposed for violations of an ethics code even though
the code itself was a non-mandatory bargaining subject.2 The D.C.
Circuit's reversal of the NLRB's holding suggests that management's
obligations with respect to effects bargaining are no more clearly defined than its obligations under the language of the NLRA.29
The circuit court refused to distinguish for bargaining purposes
the penalty provisions of the code from the code's substantive provisions. In its opinion, that distinction was "contrary to reason and at

282.
283.
284.
285.

FirstNat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681; Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 893-94.
FirstNat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 671.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 681.

286.

Id.

287.

Id. at 681-82.

288.

Id.at 682.

289.
290.
291.

Newspaper Guild, Local 10 v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 564.
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war with the practical considerations of collective bargaining."2 As
a practical matter, the Court reasoned that penalties could not be
separated under the NLRA from the substantive provisions they were
designed to enforce.3
Whether the First National Maintenance and Newspaper Guild
decisions can be reconciled is unclear. Although a decision to terminate
differs from product image or quality decisions, both cases involved
employer decisions that fell outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.
Similarly, significant employee interests were at stake in each case.
On the other hand, for bargaining purposes, it could be far easier to
separate the effects of a decision to terminate from the actual decision
to terminate than to separate the penalties enforcing a set of rules
from those rules.
A strong argument could be made that management should, at a
minimum, have an obligation to bargain over the effects of a drug
program. Determining the scope of "effects bargaining" presumably
involves the same type of balancing test used by the Court in First
National Maintenance. Once again, although the employer interests
at stake may be significant, no evidence exists to suggest that management needs to take immediate, unilateral action to protect its product.
At the same time, the penalties or "effects" under the proposed programs clearly implicate matters of "vital concern" to employees. Because professional athletes have such short careers, any type of suspension is an appropriate subject for collective bargaining. Thus,
players should, at the very least, have the right to demand bargaining
over the mechanics and penalties of a league-wide drug program.
IV.

BOARD'S DEFERRAL POLICY

As noted above in section II, the NLRB has not considered the
issue of whether drug testing constitutes a mandatory or non-mandatory subject of collective bargaining.2 In the context of professional
sports, the NLRB's failure to consider this issue has resulted from
its broad policy of deferring disputes to arbitration. The NLRB deferred to arbitration the unfair labor practice charge filed by the NFLPA
involving efforts by individual teams to conduct post-season drug
tests.29 The NFLPA withdrew its charge against the New England

292.
ing)).
293.
294.
295.

Id. (quoting Capital Times Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 651 (1976) (Chairman Fanning, dissentId.
See First Nat'lMaintenance, 452 U.S. at 674-79.
See supra notes 48-50 & 73 and accompanying text.
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Patriots after the Patriots announced their decision not to implement
a team-wide program.2 In all likelihood, the NLRB would also have
deferred this charge to arbitration had it not been withdrawn by the
union. Finally, the NFLPA, aware of the NLRB's broad deferral
policy, declined to file a charge with respect to Commissioner Rozelle's
attempt to implement a league-wide program.? 7
Arbitration is a widely accepted mechanism for labor-management
dispute resolution in the context of modern labor law. The NLRA
encourages arbitration. Section 171(a) of the NLRA declares that "settlement of issues between employers and employees through collective
bargaining may be advanced by... voluntary arbitration... ." Section
173(d) states that "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.

'298

Accordingly, the Supreme

Court's endorsement of arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes has caused the arbitration process to flourish.? More than
ninety-six percent of all labor-management collective bargaining agree3
ments incorporate some type of arbitration provisions.2
Since arbitration is commonly used to resolve contract disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements, arbitrators are frequently called upon to interpret contracts between parties. In some
situations, however, a breach of the parties' collective bargaining agreement may also constitute a statutory unfair labor practice under the
NLRA. Although the NLRB has the power to adjudicate unfair labor
practice charges, s 0' the NLRB has adopted broad deferral policies to
deal with this overlapping jurisdictional problem. As a result, the
unfair labor practice charge is frequently neither resolved nor addressed by the NLRB.

296.
297.

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
For a summary of each of these three disputes, see supra notes 47-94 and accompanying

text.
298. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(b), 173(d) (1982).
299. In 1960, the Supreme Court, in three cases that became known as the Steelworkers
Trilogy, expressed approval of the use of arbitration in labor-management relations. See United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 374 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
300. Fowler, Arbitration, the Trilogy andIndividual Rights: DevelopmentsSince Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver, 36 LAB. L.J. 173, 174 (1985); see also, Zifchak, Agency Deferral to Private
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (1973).
301. 29 U.S.C.§ 153(a)-(d) (1982).
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The issue of deferral arises when an alleged violation of the NLRA
also constitutes an alleged breach of a provision in the collective bargaining agreement subject to arbitration. A NLRB decision to defer
a dispute to arbitration occurs in one of two situations. First, if an
arbitrator's award exists, the NLRB may choose to defer to the award
and dismiss the unfair labor practice charge. Second, if the arbitration
process has not begun or is not yet complete, the NLRB may decide
to foreclose its process until arbitration is complete. The NLRB has
adopted a separate deferral policy to deal with each situation.
Under the NLRB's current post arbitration deferral policy, it will
not consider an unfair labor practice charge if an arbitrator has
adequately considered the charge and the decision is not palpably
wrong. 3 2 A charge is adequately considered if the contract and unfair
labor practice issues are factually parallel and the arbitrator was presented with facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice
charge. 03 A decision is palpably wrong only if there is no possible
interpretation of the decision that is consistent with the NLRA.3 ° The
NLRB stated that it would not require the arbitrator's award to be
totally consistent with NLRB precedent. °5 According to its policy of
pre-arbitration deferral, the NLRB will apparently defer to an arbitration mechanism, if the mechanism clearly encompasses a dispute
that arose in conjunction with an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and the charged party is willing to arbitrate the
dispute.

302. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1985). The Board first articulated its policy of
post arbitration deferral in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). Under the Spielberg
doctrine, the Board would defer to an existing arbitrator's award if the arbitration proceeding
had been procedurally fair, all of the parties agreed to be bound and the arbitrator's decision
was not clearly repugnant to the purpose of the policies of the Act. Id. at 1082. Since Spielberg,
the Board has vacillated between an aggressive and reluctant deferral policy. See Mack &
Bernstein, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: The Arbitrator's Demanding Role, 40
Arb. J. 33 (1985); Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60

WASH. L. REV. 355, 357-59 (1985). However, the Board recently readopted a strong deferral
policy in Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. The "palpably wrong" standard appears to be consistent

with the clearly "repugnant standard" articulated in Spielberg.
303.

Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.

304. Id.
305. Id.; see also Peck, supra note 302, at 358.
306. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984). The Board first enunciated
its pre-arbitration deferral policy in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). In Collyer,

the Board stated that it would defer to the arbitration process when the dispute arose in the
context of CBA interpretation. Id. at 841. In the Board's opinion, such disputes were "eminently"
well suited for resolution by an arbitrator. Id. at 842. The Board also required that the arbitration
process be procedurally fair. Id.
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Various grounds justify the NLRB's willingness to defer to arbitration. For example, speed, efficiency, and flexibility are often cited
as reasons for deferral. 3 7 Additionally, the arbitrator is presumed to
have expertise in this area because of frequent contact with labor-management disputes and contracts.3 8 Despite the NLRB's broad deferral
policies, however, deferral is frequently inappropriate.
Admittedly, the typical arbitration mechanism is faster than the
NLRB's machinery. Yet this justification for deferral is undermined
if the victim of an unfair labor practice is willing to forego speed for
an NLRB ruling. In addition, arbitrators, regardless of their contract
expertise, do not necessarily have any particular expertise to enable
them to construe public statutory rights. In fact, the arbitrator may
avoid the potentially more volatile unfair labor practice issue altogether
in an attempt to preserve the arbitrator's role. 3°9 Thus, the NLRB's
position not to hold arbitrators strictly to NLRB precedent is disturbing. Because arbitrators often lack the expertise and incentive to resolve unfair labor practice charges, they should not be able to shape
statutory rights or the future of national labor policy.
Regardless of the justifications for arbitration, deferral is clearly
inappropriate if the unfair labor practice charge, left unresolved, will
likely be the subject of a subsequent dispute between the parties.
Arbitration is only appropriate to resolve disputes concerning existing
agreements. It is an inappropriate mechanism for determining future
bargaining obligations, and it should not be used as a substitute for
collective bargaining.3 10 Thus, the NLRB should not defer if the dispute
is not covered by the contract and therefore involves the acquisition
of new rights, if the unfair labor practice charge is likely to create
confusion over the bargaining obligations of the parties in future negotiations, or if the charge is likely to arise again, regardless of the
arbitrator's decision, either during the life of the contract or upon the
expiration of the existing agreement. In fact, the NLRB effectively
abdicates its statutory responsibility by deferring to arbitration in
these situations.
As the NFLMC and NFLPA approach the upcoming negotiations
for a new collective bargaining agreement, the NLRB's deferral policy

The Board's pre-arbitration policy has, like its post-arbitration policy, changed from time to
time. See Mack & Bernstein, supra note 302, at 34. Its most recent pre-arbitration deferral
statement was articulated in United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 558-60.
307. See, e.g., United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 558-60.
308. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 84243.
309. See, e.g., Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 846-50 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
310. Id.
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appears questionable. Neither party can be certain whether the topic
of drugs is a mandatory or non-mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The confusion over this issue could, depending on the parties'
respective positions, be the focus of additional disputes. The NLRB
should have anticipated the possibility of future disputes, addressed
the underlying unfair labor practice charge, and eliminated this potential confusion.
V.

CONCLUSION

During the past two years, drug abuse and drug testing have
become two of the most publicized issues in professional sports. As
the NFLMC and NFLPA approach negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement, free agency and the appropriate allocation of
industry revenues appear to be the primary focus of dispute between
the parties. Nonetheless, the issue of drug testing could become a
major issue or at least a bargaining chip in the negotiations.
Unfortunately, much uncertainty surrounds the bargaining rights
and obligations of the parties with respect to a drug testing program.
Neither party knows for certain whether management can unilaterally
implement a drug program, bargain to impasse, use economic weapons,
or condition an agreement upon the acceptance of a drug testing program. Resolution of these issues depends upon whether the topic of
drug testing is categorized as a mandatory or non-mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. Neither the NLRB nor the courts have addressed this issue.
The general language of section 8(d) of the NLRA, the Supreme
Court, the NLRB, and the lower court holdings suggest that the topic
of drug testing constitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Owners have a legitimate interest in determining the product
offered to consumers and protecting the product's image. Yet, neither
the NLRA nor existing case law authorizes unilateral employer action
at the expense of legitimate employee interests if other remedies are
available to protect the product and no business exigency exists to
justify unilateral action.
Because the 1982 collective bargaining agreement addressed the
topic of drug testing, management's subsequent attempts to unilaterally implement an expanded drug program allegedly constitute a
breach of the 1982 agreement. The NLRB deferred the NFLPA's
unfair labor practice charge to arbitration. As a result, each of the
previous disputes between the NFLPA and NFLMC concerning drug
testing was resolved on contractual grounds.
The NLRB has not addressed the issue of whether drug testing
constitutes a mandatory or non-mandatory subject of collective bar-
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gaining. As the current agreement expires, the NFLPA will undoubtedly challenge any management attempts to unilaterally implement
a drug testing program or to refuse to bargain over the issue of drug
testing. Hopefully, the NLRB will take such an opportunity to clarify
the mandatory nature of a drug testing program.
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